The Prince

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The cleaning toys for 7 year oldsPrince

by Nicolo Machiavelli

Translated by W. K. Marriott

Contents

Nicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to 1512held an official post at Florence which included diplomatic missions tovarious European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; later exiled andreturned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd June 1527.

INTRODUCTION

Nicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the secondson of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, and ofBartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were members of theold Florentine nobility.

His life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularlyenough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history ofFlorence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as anItalian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de’ Medici, Il Magnifico. Thedownfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which yearMachiavelli entered the public service. During his official careerFlorence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted until1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his office.The Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they were oncemore driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’s literary activityand increasing influence; but he died, within a few weeks of the expulsionof the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his fifty-eighth year, without havingregained office.

YOUTH — Æt. 1-25—1469-94

Although there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, theFlorence of those days is so well known that the early environment of thisrepresentative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been describedas a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by the ferventand austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving Lorenzo.Savonarola’s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have been slight,for although at one time he wielded immense power over the fortunes ofFlorence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a gibe in ThePrince, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed prophet who came toa bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean rule during the lifeof Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli strongly, for hefrequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to Lorenzo’s grandsonthat he dedicates The Prince.

Machiavelli, in his “History of Florence,” gives us a picture of the youngmen among whom his youth was passed. He writes: “They were freer thantheir forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other kinds ofexcesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, and women;their chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with wit andacuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly was thoughtthe wisest.” In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli shows why youthshould avail itself of its opportunities for study, and leads us to inferthat his own youth had been so occupied. He writes: “I have received yourletter, which has given me the greatest pleasure, especially because youtell me you are quite restored in health, than which I could have nobetter news; for if God grant life to you, and to me, I hope to make agood man of you if you are willing to do your share.” Then, writing of anew patron, he continues: “This will turn out well for you, but it isnecessary for you to study; since, then, you have no longer the excuse ofillness, take pains to study letters and music, for you see what honour isdone to me for the little skill I have. Therefore, my son, if you wish toplease me, and to bring success and honour to yourself, do right andstudy, because others will help you if you help yourself.”

OFFICE — Æt. 25-43—1494-1512

The second period of Machiavelli’s life was spent in the service of thefree Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from theexpulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After servingfour years in one of the public offices he was appointed Chancellor andSecretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and Peace. Here weare on firm ground when dealing with the events of Machiavelli’s life, forduring this time he took a leading part in the affairs of the Republic,and we have its decrees, records, and dispatches to guide us, as well ashis own writings. A mere recapitulation of a few of his transactions withthe statesmen and soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of hisactivities, and supplies the sources from which he drew the experiencesand characters which illustrate The Prince.

His first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, “my lady of Forli” ofThe Prince, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it is farbetter to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on fortresses.This is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is urged by him inmany ways as a matter of vital importance to princes.

In 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII forcontinuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct ofaffairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraftsummarized in The Prince, and was consequently driven out. He, also, itwas who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support toPope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge thatsuch promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the faithof princes.

Machiavelli’s public life was largely occupied with events arising out ofthe ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the DukeValentino, and these characters fill a large space of The Prince.Machiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke for thebenefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have seized; he can,indeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the pattern of CesareBorgia’s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed by some critics as the“hero” of The Prince. Yet in The Princethe duke is in point of factcited as a type of the man who rises on the fortune of others, and fallswith them; who takes every course that might be expected from a prudentman but the course which will save him; who is prepared for alleventualities but the one which happens; and who, when all his abilitiesfail to carry him through, exclaims that it was not his fault, but anextraordinary and unforeseen fatality.

On the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to watchthe election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia cheated intoallowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano delle Rovere(Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most reason to fear theduke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election, says that he whothinks new favours will cause great personages to forget old injuriesdeceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had ruined Cesare.

It was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that pontiffwas commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought to asuccessful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing chiefly tohis impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius thatMachiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and women, andconcludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man that will winand hold them both.

It is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italianstates, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, withresults that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those events,and with the three great actors in them, so far only as they impinge onthe personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with Louis XII ofFrance, and his estimate of that monarch’s character has already beenalluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as the man whoaccomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but who in realityhad no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, had he allowedhimself to be influenced by such motives, would have been ruined. TheEmperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men of the age, and hischaracter has been drawn by many hands; but Machiavelli, who was an envoyat his court in 1507-8, reveals the secret of his many failures when hedescribes him as a secretive man, without force of character—ignoringthe human agencies necessary to carry his schemes into effect, and neverinsisting on the fulfilment of his wishes.

The remaining years of Machiavelli’s official career were filled withevents arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between thethree great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with theobject of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in thebattle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won in eighthundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during these events,complicated as they were by the feud which broke out between the pope andthe French, because friendship with France had dictated the entire policyof the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II finally formed the Holy Leagueagainst France, and with the assistance of the Swiss drove the French outof Italy, Florence lay at the mercy of the Pope, and had to submit to histerms, one of which was that the Medici should be restored. The return ofthe Medici to Florence on 1st September 1512, and the consequent fall ofthe Republic, was the signal for the dismissal of Machiavelli and hisfriends, and thus put an end to his public career, for, as we have seen,he died without regaining office.

LITERATURE AND DEATH — Æt. 43-58—1512-27

On the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had vainlyhoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, wasdismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he wasaccused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici,imprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope, LeoX, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at SanCasciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In aletter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a veryinteresting description of his life at this period, which elucidates hismethods and his motives in writing The Prince. After describing hisdaily occupations with his family and neighbours, he writes: “The eveningbeing come, I return home and go to my study; at the entrance I pull offmy peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt, and put on my noble courtdress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass into the ancient courts ofthe men of old, where, being lovingly received by them, I am fed with thatfood which is mine alone; where I do not hesitate to speak with them, andto ask for the reason of their actions, and they in their benignity answerme; and for four hours I feel no weariness, I forget every trouble,poverty does not dismay, death does not terrify me; I am possessedentirely by those great men. And because Dante says:

Knowledge doth come of learning well retained,
Unfruitful else,

I have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and havecomposed a small work on ‘Principalities,’ where I pour myself out asfully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what aprincipality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how theycan be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever pleased you,this ought not to displease you: and to a prince, especially to a new one,it should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it to his MagnificenceGiuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will be able to tell youwhat is in it, and of the discourses I have had with him; nevertheless, Iam still enriching and polishing it.”

The “little book” suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form inwhich it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work during itscomposition; its title and patron were changed; and for some unknownreason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de’ Medici. AlthoughMachiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent orpresented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo everreceived or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli anyemployment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli’s lifetime,The Princewas never published by him, and its text is still disputable.

Machiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: “And as to this littlething [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that during thefifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have neither sleptnor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by one who has reapedexperience at the expense of others. And of my loyalty none could doubt,because having always kept faith I could not now learn how to break it;for he who has been faithful and honest, as I have, cannot change hisnature; and my poverty is a witness to my honesty.”

Before Machiavelli had got The Princeoff his hands he commenced his“Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,” which should be readconcurrently with The Prince. These and several minor works occupied himuntil the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look after theaffairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the Medicean rulersof Florence granted a few political concessions to her citizens, andMachiavelli with others was consulted upon a new constitution under whichthe Great Council was to be restored; but on one pretext or another it wasnot promulgated.

In 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli tosettle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly remarkablefor his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he was muchsought after, and also for the production of his “Art of War.” It was inthe same year that he received a commission at the instance of Cardinalde’ Medici to write the “History of Florence,” a task which occupied himuntil 1525. His return to popular favour may have determined the Medici togive him this employment, for an old writer observes that “an ablestatesman out of work, like a huge whale, will endeavour to overturn theship unless he has an empty cask to play with.”

When the “History of Florence” was finished, Machiavelli took it to Romefor presentation to his patron, Giuliano de’ Medici, who had in themeanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is somewhatremarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written The Princefor theinstruction of the Medici after they had just regained power in Florence,so, in 1525, he dedicated the “History of Florence” to the head of thefamily when its ruin was now at hand. In that year the battle of Paviadestroyed the French rule in Italy, and left Francis I a prisoner in thehands of his great rival, Charles V. This was followed by the sack ofRome, upon the news of which the popular party at Florence threw off theyoke of the Medici, who were once more banished.

Machiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened hisreturn, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the “Ten ofLiberty and Peace.” Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reachedFlorence, where he died on 22nd June 1527.

THE MAN AND HIS WORKS

No one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florencehas decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her mostfamous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have found inhis works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the germs of herrenaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle to protestagainst the world-wide and evil signification of his name, it may bepointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which thissinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that theresearches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him morereasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an “unholynecromancer,” which so long haunted men’s vision, has begun to fade.

Machiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, andindustry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, andwith his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforcedretirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he depictedby his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the successfulstatesman and author, for he appears to have been only moderatelyprosperous in his several embassies and political employments. He wasmisled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, overawed by CesareBorgia; several of his embassies were quite barren of results; hisattempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery that he raisedastonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct of his own affairshe was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear by the side ofSoderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of compromising himself; hisconnection with the Medici was open to suspicion, and Giuliano appears tohave recognized his real forte when he set him to write the “History ofFlorence,” rather than employ him in the state. And it is on the literaryside of his character, and there alone, that we find no weakness and nofailure.

Although the light of almost four centuries has been focused on ThePrince, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because theyare the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as theyare, its ethics are those of Machiavelli’s contemporaries; yet they cannotbe said to be out of date so long as the governments of Europe rely onmaterial rather than on moral forces. Its historical incidents andpersonages become interesting by reason of the uses which Machiavellimakes of them to illustrate his theories of government and conduct.

Leaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnishsome European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, ThePrinceis bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men arestill the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the days ofAlexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices whichMachiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. Men willnot look at things as they really are, but as they wish them to be—andare ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses; prudenceconsists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then—to pass to ahigher plane—Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win anempire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the armsof a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to fight.

It is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli’s that government shouldbe elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the peoplewith a just recognition of the fundamental principles of society; to this“high argument” The Princecontributes but little. Machiavelli alwaysrefused to write either of men or of governments otherwise than as hefound them, and he writes with such skill and insight that his work is ofabiding value. But what invests The Princewith more than a merelyartistic or historical interest is the incontrovertible truth that itdeals with the great principles which still guide nations and rulers intheir relationship with each other and their neighbours.

In translating The Princemy aim has been to achieve at all costs anexact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent paraphraseadapted to the modern notions of style and expression. Machiavelli was nofacile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he wrote obliged him to weighevery word; his themes were lofty, his substance grave, his manner nobly plainand serious. Quis eo fuit unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, inexplanandis pressior?In The Prince, it may be truly said, there isreason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of every word.To an Englishman of Shakespeare’s time the translation of such a treatisewas in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius ofthe English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to theEnglishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example: the wordintrattenere, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy adopted bythe Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would by an Elizabethanbe correctly rendered “entertain,” and every contemporary readerwould understand what was meant by saying that “Rome entertainedthe Ætolians and the Achaeans without augmenting their power.” But to-daysuch a phrase would seem obsolete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we arecompelled to say that “Rome maintained friendly relations with theÆtolians,” etc., using four words to do the work of one. I have triedto preserve the pithy brevity of the Italian so far as was consistent with anabsolute fidelity to the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I canonly hope that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author’smeaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it.

The following is a list of the works of Machiavelli:

Principal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo ditrattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto dalduca Valentino nell’ ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo,etc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; Decennale primo(poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell’ Alemagna, 1508-12;Decennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di Francia, 1510; Discorsisopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., 1512-17; Il Principe, 1513;Andria, comedy translated from Terence, 1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedyin five acts, with prologue in verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514;Clizia, comedy in prose, 1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515;Asino d’oro (poem in terza rima), 1517; Dell’ arte della guerra, 1519-20;Discorso sopra il riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cosedella citta di Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520;Istorie fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525.

Other poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti carnascialeschi.

Editions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, 6vols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., 1820-2;Passerini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7.

Minor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E. Alvisi,1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. G.Canestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri intornoallo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. Ferrara, ThePrivate Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929.

DEDICATION

To the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De’ Medici

Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed to comebefore him with such things as they hold most precious, or in which they seehim take most delight; whence one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold,precious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of theirgreatness.

Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some testimonyof my devotion towards you, I have not found among my possessions anythingwhich I hold more dear than, or value so much as, the knowledge of the actionsof great men, acquired by long experience in contemporary affairs, and acontinual study of antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great andprolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to yourMagnificence.

And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance,nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable, seeingthat it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to offer you theopportunity of understanding in the shortest time all that I have learnt in somany years, and with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have notembellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with roundedperiods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments whatever, with whichso many are accustomed to embellish their works; for I have wished either thatno honour should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and theweightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable.

Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low andhumble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of princes; because,just as those who draw landscapes place themselves below in the plain tocontemplate the nature of the mountains and of lofty places, and in order tocontemplate the plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so tounderstand the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to understandthat of princes it needs to be of the people.

Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I sendit; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you will learn myextreme desire that you should attain that greatness which fortune and yourother attributes promise. And if your Magnificence from the summit of yourgreatness will sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will seehow unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune.

THE PRINCE

CHAPTER I.
HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED

All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have beenand are either republics or principalities.

Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been longestablished; or they are new.

The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or theyare, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the prince whohas acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of the King ofSpain.

Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a prince,or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of the princehimself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.

CHAPTER II.
CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES

I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another placeI have written of them at length, and will address myself only toprincipalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, anddiscuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.

I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states,and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new ones;for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors,and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince ofaverage powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived ofit by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be sodeprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he willregain it.

We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not havewithstood the attacks of the Venetians in ’84, nor those of Pope Julius in’10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For thehereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence ithappens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices causehim to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will benaturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration ofhis rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for onechange always leaves the toothing for another.

CHAPTER III.
CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES

But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it benot entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, takencollectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from aninherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for menchange their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hopeinduces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they aredeceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone frombad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity,which always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to himwith his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put uponhis new acquisition.

In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizingthat principality, and you are not able to keep those friends who put youthere because of your not being able to satisfy them in the way theyexpected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling boundto them. For, although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet inentering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives.

For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupiedMilan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it onlyneeded Lodovico’s own forces; because those who had opened the gates tohim, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, wouldnot endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is very true that,after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, they are not solightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with little reluctance, takesthe opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear outthe suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus tocause France to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the DukeLodovico^[1]to raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a secondtime it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armiesshould be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causesabove mentioned.

[1]Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who marriedBeatrice d’Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the secondtime. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains toname those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what anyone in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more securelyin his acquisition than did the King of France.

Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to anancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country andlanguage, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them,especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and tohold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the princewho was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other thingsthe old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietlytogether, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy,which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, although theremay be some difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike,and the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He whohas annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind twoconsiderations: the one, that the family of their former lord isextinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes arealtered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one bodywith the old principality.

But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs,or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy areneeded to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would bethat he who has acquired them should go and reside there. This would makehis position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk inGreece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him forholding that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been ableto keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as theyspring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand,they are heard of only when they are great, and then one can no longerremedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged by your officials;the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishingto be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise,to fear him. He who would attack that state from the outside must have theutmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrestedfrom him with the greatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do thisor else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A princedoes not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can sendthem out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of thecitizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the newinhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, arenever able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily keptquiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it shouldhappen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion,I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, theyinjure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered,cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be welltreated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighterinjuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that isto be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand infear of revenge.

But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends muchmore, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, sothat the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated,because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the garrisonup and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile,and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet ableto do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as acolony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respectsought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerfulneighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care thatno foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footingthere; for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced bythose who are discontented, either through excess of ambition or throughfear, as one has seen already. The Romans were brought into Greece by theÆtolians; and in every other country where they obtained a footing theywere brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs isthat, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subjectstates are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against theruling power. So that in respect to those subject states he has not totake any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of themquickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only totake care that they do not get hold of too much power and too muchauthority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he caneasily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirelymaster in the country. And he who does not properly manage this businesswill soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he willhave endless difficulties and troubles.

The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely thesemeasures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with^[2]the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down thegreater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greeceappears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and Ætolians were keptfriendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was drivenout; yet the merits of the Achaeans and Ætolians never secured for thempermission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip everinduce the Romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did theinfluence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship overthe country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princesought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also futureones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, itis easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is nolonger in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this,as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of themalady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time,not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy todetect but difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when theevils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man tosee), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having beenforeseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can seethem, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles,dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to ahead, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off tothe advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip andAntiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could haveavoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them whichis forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:—Let us enjoy thebenefits of the time—but rather the benefits of their own valour andprudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring with itgood as well as evil, and evil as well as good.

[2]See remark in the introduction on the word “intrattenere.”

But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of thethings mentioned. I will speak of Louis^[3](and not of Charles)^[4]as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having heldpossession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he has donethe opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composedof divers elements.

[3]Louis XII, King of France, “The Father of the People,” born 1462,died 1515.

[4]Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, whodesired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I willnot blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a footholdin Italy, and having no friends there—seeing rather that every doorwas shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles—he was forced toaccept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeededvery quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made somemistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at oncethe authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentinesbecame his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, theBentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini,of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, the Sienese—everybodymade advances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetiansrealize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order thatthey might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master oftwo-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could havemaintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laiddown, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although theywere numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church,some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced tostand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himselfsecure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milanthan he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy theRomagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakeninghimself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrownthemselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding muchtemporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. Andhaving committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so muchso that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent hisbecoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and deprivedhimself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, divided itwith the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter in Italy hetakes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and themalcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and whereas hecould have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove himout, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always doso when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but whenthey cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly andblame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forcesshe ought to have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to havedivided it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians inLombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold inItaly, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse ofthat necessity.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, heincreased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he broughtin a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not sendcolonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to injure him had henot made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians;because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy,it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; buthaving first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to theirruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others fromdesigns on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consentedexcept to become masters themselves there; also because the others wouldnot wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to theVenetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the courage.

And if any one should say: “King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexanderand the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,” I answer for the reasons givenabove that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because it isnot to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And if anothershould allege the pledge which the king had given to the Pope that he wouldassist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of hismarriage^[5]and for the cap to Rouen,^[6]to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes,and how it ought to be kept.

[5]Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and married in 1499Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to retain the Duchy ofBrittany for the crown.

[6]The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d’Amboise, created a cardinal byAlexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the conditionsobserved by those who have taken possession of countries and wished toretain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is reasonableand quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, whenValentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usuallycalled, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me thatthe Italians did not understand war, I replied to him that the French didnot understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not haveallowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seenthat the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused byFrance, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general ruleis drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of anotherbecoming powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been broughtabout either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted byhim who has been raised to power.

CHAPTER IV.
WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THESUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH

Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newlyacquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Greatbecame the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was scarcelysettled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire wouldhave rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and hadto meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves fromtheir own ambitions.

I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to begoverned in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body ofservants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favourand permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity byantiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons havestates and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold themin natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince and hisservants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all thecountry there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and if theyyield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, andthey do not bear him any particular affection.

The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and theKing of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord,the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, hesends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as hechooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient bodyof lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; theyhave their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except athis peril. Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognizegreat difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it isconquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the difficulties inseizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called inby the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in hisdesigns by the revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arisesfrom the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves andbondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expectlittle advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannotcarry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he whoattacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and hewill have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others;but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in sucha way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but thefamily of this prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no oneto fear, the others having no credit with the people; and as the conquerordid not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear themafter it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because onecan easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, for onealways finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, for thereasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victoryeasy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinitedifficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those youhave crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family ofthe prince, because the lords that remain make themselves the heads offresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to satisfy orexterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius,you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore it wasonly necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in the field, andthen to take the country from him. After which victory, Darius beingkilled, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the above reasons. Andif his successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely andat their ease, for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom exceptthose they provoked themselves.

But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constitutedlike that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against theRomans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalitiesthere were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of themendured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the powerand long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away, and theRomans then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards amongstthemselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of thecountry, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the familyof the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans wereacknowledged.

When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with whichAlexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which othershave had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; this isnot occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, butby the want of uniformity in the subject state.

CHAPTER V.
CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIROWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have beenaccustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are threecourses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, thenext is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to liveunder their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it anoligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government,being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without hisfriendship and interest, and does its utmost to support him; and thereforehe who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily bythe means of its own citizens than in any other way.

There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans heldAthens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they lostthem. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as theSpartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did notsucceed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in thecountry, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise thanby ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedomand does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for inrebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancientprivileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will evercause it to forget. And whatever you may do or provide against, they neverforget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited ordispersed, but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as Pisaafter the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the Florentines.

But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, andhis family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obeyand on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in makingone from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to governthemselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and aprince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But inrepublics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire forvengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of theirformer liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or toreside there.

CHAPTER VI.
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE’S OWN ARMS ANDABILITY

Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities asI shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state;because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, andfollowing by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to theways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise manought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate thosewho have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, atleast it will savour of it. Let him act like the clever archers who,designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowingthe limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim muchhigher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so greata height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the markthey wish to reach.

I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is anew prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, accordinglyas there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the state. Now,as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station presupposes eitherability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these things willmitigate in some degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has reliedleast on fortune is established the strongest. Further, it facilitatesmatters when the prince, having no other state, is compelled to residethere in person.

But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune,have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, andsuch like are the most excellent examples. And although one may notdiscuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet heought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy tospeak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired orfounded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particulardeeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior tothose of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in examiningtheir actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortunebeyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould into the formwhich seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their powers of mindwould have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunitywould have come in vain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people ofIsrael in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order thatthey should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out ofbondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and thathe should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become Kingof Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus shouldfind the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, and theMedes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not haveshown his ability had he not found the Athenians dispersed. Theseopportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high abilityenabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby their country wasennobled and made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire aprincipality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The difficultiesthey have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules and methodswhich they are forced to introduce to establish their government and itssecurity. And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing moredifficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain inits success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order ofthings, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done wellunder the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do wellunder the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, whohave the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, whodo not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experienceof them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have theopportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others defendlukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matterthoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves orhave to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate theirenterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the firstinstance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything; but whenthey can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarelyendangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and theunarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, thenature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them,it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessaryto take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may bepossible to make them believe by force.

If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not haveenforced their constitutions for long—as happened in our time to FraGirolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of thingsimmediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no meansof keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers tobelieve. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummatingtheir enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet withability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and thosewho envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to berespected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured,and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears someresemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind: it isHiero the Syracusan.^[1]This man rose from a private station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he,either, owe anything to fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, beingoppressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by beingmade their prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, thatone who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. Thisman abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances, madenew ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such foundations he wasable to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had endured much trouble inacquiring, he had but little in keeping.

[1]Hiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.

CHAPTER VII.
CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERSOR BY GOOD FORTUNE

Those who solely by good fortune become princes from being privatecitizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; theyhave not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they havemany when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state isgiven either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happenedto many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, whereprinces were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities bothfor his security and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by thecorruption of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such standsimply elevated upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevatedthem—two most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they theknowledge requisite for the position; because, unless they are men ofgreat worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they shouldknow how to command, having always lived in a private condition; besides,they cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keepfriendly and faithful.

States that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which areborn and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and correspondencies^[1]fixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them; unless, as issaid, those who unexpectedly become princes are men of so much ability thatthey know they have to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune hasthrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laidbeforethey became princes, they must lay afterwards.

[1]“Le radici e corrispondenze,” their roots (i.e. foundations) andcorrespondencies or relations with other states—a common meaning of“correspondence” and “correspondency” in the sixteenthand seventeenth centuries.

Concerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or fortune, Iwish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and these areFrancesco Sforza^[2]and Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper means and with great ability, frombeing a private person rose to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquiredwith a thousand anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand,Cesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state duringthe ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstandingthat he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wiseand able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and fortunesof others had bestowed on him.

[2]Francesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria Visconti, anatural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, on whose death heprocured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli was the accredited agentof the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia (1478-1507) during thetransactions which led up to the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli atSinigalia, and along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left anaccount, written ten years before The Prince, of the proceedings of theduke in his “Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nelloammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli,” etc., a translation of which is appendedto the present work.

Because, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations maybe able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laidwith trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, therefore,all the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be seen that helaid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not consider itsuperfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts togive a new prince than the example of his actions; and if his dispositionswere of no avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary andextreme malignity of fortune.

Alexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had manyimmediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way tomake him master of any state that was not a state of the Church; and if hewas willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan and theVenetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already underthe protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy,especially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands that wouldfear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesiand their following. It behoved him, therefore, to upset this state ofaffairs and embroil the powers, so as to make himself securely master ofpart of their states. This was easy for him to do, because he found theVenetians, moved by other reasons, inclined to bring back the French intoItaly; he would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easyby dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king cameinto Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent ofAlexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from himfor the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation ofthe king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten theColonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was hinderedby two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to him, the other,the goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that the forces of theOrsini, which he was using, would not stand to him, that not only mightthey hinder him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he hadwon, and that the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had awarning when, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them govery unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mindwhen he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, andthe king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided todepend no more upon the arms and the luck of others.

For the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in Rome, bygaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them hisgentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their rank, honouring themwith office and command in such a way that in a few months all attachment tothe factions was destroyed and turned entirely to the duke. After this heawaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents ofthe Colonna house. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini,perceiving at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church wasruin to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung therebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dangers to theduke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Having restored hisauthority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French or otheroutside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well how toconceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Pagolo—whom the dukedid not fail to secure with all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel,and horses—the Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity broughtthem into his power at Sinigalia.^[3]Having exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends,the duke laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all theRomagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciatetheir prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. And as this point isworthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave itout.

[3]Sinigalia, 31st December 1502.

When the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak masters,who rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave them more causefor disunion than for union, so that the country was full of robbery, quarrels,and every kind of violence; and so, wishing to bring back peace and obedienceto authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereuponhe promoted Messer Ramiro d’Orco,^[4]a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a shorttime restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the dukeconsidered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for hehad no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgmentin the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had theiradvocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some hatredagainst himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain thementirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had beenpractised, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of theminister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to beexecuted and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife athis side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at oncesatisfied and dismayed.

[4]Ramiro d’Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.

But let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding himselfnow sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers byhaving armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure crushedthose forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to proceedwith his conquest, had next to consider France, for he knew that the king,who too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. And fromthis time he began to seek new alliances and to temporize with France inthe expedition which she was making towards the kingdom of Naples againstthe Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to securehimself against them, and this he would have quickly accomplished hadAlexander lived.

Such was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future hehad to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church mightnot be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that whichAlexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, byexterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as totake away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself allthe gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their aid,as has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the college more to himself.Fourthly, by acquiring so much power before the Pope should die that hecould by his own measures resist the first shock. Of these four things, atthe death of Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had killed asmany of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few hadescaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerousparty in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended tobecome master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino,and Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France(for the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by theSpaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), hepounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once,partly through hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and theFlorentines would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as hewas prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so muchpower and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longerhave depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his ownpower and ability.

But Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He left theduke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the rest in the air,between two most powerful hostile armies, and sick unto death. Yet there werein the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how men are to bewon or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he hadlaid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been ingood health, he would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that hisfoundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. InRome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the Baglioni, theVitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect anythingagainst him. If he could not have made Pope him whom he wished, at least theone whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But if he had been insound health at the death of Alexander,^[5]everything would have been different to him. On the day that Julius theSecond^[6]waselected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might occur at thedeath of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, except that he hadnever anticipated that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on thepoint to die.

[5]Alexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.

[6]Julius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula, born1443, died 1513.

When all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to blamehim, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to offerhim for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of others,are raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit andfar-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, andonly the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sicknessfrustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to securehimself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome either byforce or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to befollowed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those who have poweror reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things for new, to besevere and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyalsoldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings and princesin such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with caution,cannot find a more lively example than the actions of this man.

Only can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he made abad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope to his ownmind, he could have hindered any other from being elected Pope; and he oughtnever to have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he had injured orwho had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. For men injure either fromfear or hatred. Those whom he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro adVincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio.^[7]The rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted;the latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from hisinfluence, the kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, aboveeverything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him,he ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula. He whobelieves that new benefits will cause great personages to forget old injuriesis deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause ofhis ultimate ruin.

[7]San Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.

CHAPTER VIII.
CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS

Although a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither ofwhich can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is manifestto me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be morecopiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are when, eitherby some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the principality, or whenby the favour of his fellow-citizens a private person becomes the princeof his country. And speaking of the first method, it will be illustratedby two examples—one ancient, the other modern—and withoutentering further into the subject, I consider these two examples willsuffice those who may be compelled to follow them.

Agathocles, the Sicilian,^[1]became King of Syracuse not only from a private but from a low and abjectposition. This man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in hisfortunes always led an infamous life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamieswith so much ability of mind and body that, having devoted himself to themilitary profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Beingestablished in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himselfprince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which hadbeen conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for this purposewith Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was fighting in Sicily. Onemorning he assembled the people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had todiscuss with them things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal thesoldiers killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, heseized and held the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. Andalthough he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yetnot only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for itsdefence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised thesiege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, werecompelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had tobe content with the possession of Africa.

[1]Agathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.

Therefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man willsee nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as heattained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any one,but step by step in the military profession, which steps were gained witha thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly held by himwith many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent to slayfellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy,without religion; such methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, ifthe courage of Agathocles in entering into and extricating himself fromdangers be considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring andovercoming hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed lessthan the most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty andinhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebratedamong the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed eitherto fortune or genius.

In our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da Fermo,having been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by hismaternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his youth sentto fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his discipline,he might attain some high position in the military profession. AfterPagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very shorttime, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body and mind, he became thefirst man in his profession. But it appearing a paltry thing to serveunder others, he resolved, with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whomthe slavery of their country was dearer than its liberty, and with thehelp of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Foglianithat, having been away from home for many years, he wished to visit himand his city, and in some measure to look upon his patrimony; and althoughhe had not laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order thatthe citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired tocome honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, hisfriends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he shouldbe received honourably by the Fermians, all of which would be not only tohis honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.

Giovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, andhe caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he lodged himin his own house, where, having passed some days, and having arranged whatwas necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a solemn banquet towhich he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of Fermo. When theviands and all the other entertainments that are usual in such banquetswere finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave discourses,speaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and oftheir enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and others answered; but herose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a moreprivate place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni andthe rest of the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they seatedthan soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and therest. After these murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up anddown the town and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that infear the people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, ofwhich he made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who wereable to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and militaryordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held theprincipality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he hadbecome formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would havebeen as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself tobe overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelliat Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committedthis parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he hadmade his leader in valour and wickedness.

Some may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after infinitetreacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his country, anddefend himself from external enemies, and never be conspired against by his owncitizens; seeing that many others, by means of cruelty, have never been ableeven in peaceful times to hold the state, still less in the doubtful times ofwar. I believe that this follows from severities^[2]being badly or properly used. Those may be called properly used, if of evil itis possible to speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary toone’s security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they canbe turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which,notwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time ratherthan decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God orman, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossiblefor those who follow the other to maintain themselves.

[2]Mr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern equivalent ofMachiavelli’s thought when he speaks of “crudelta” than themore obvious “cruelties.”

Hence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought toexamine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him toinflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat themdaily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them,and win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either fromtimidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in hishand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselvesto him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries oughtto be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less;benefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavour of themmay last longer.

And above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such away that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall makehim change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled times, youare too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for theywill be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under anyobligation to you for them.

CHAPTER IX.
CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

But coming to the other point—where a leading citizen becomes theprince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, butby the favour of his fellow citizens—this may be called a civilprincipality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain toit, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality isobtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of thenobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, andfrom this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressedby the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; andfrom these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of threeresults, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy.

A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles,seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation ofone of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his shadowthey can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannotresist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves, andmake him a prince so as to be defended by his authority. He who obtainssovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with moredifficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because theformer finds himself with many around him who consider themselves hisequals, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to hisliking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himselfalone, and has none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object ismore righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added alsothat a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, becauseof there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, asthey are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a hostilepeople is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not onlyto fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against him; for they,being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always come forward intime to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expectto prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the samepeople, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make andunmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to belooked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape theircourse in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they donot. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to behonoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with intwo ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a naturalwant of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, especiallyof those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity youhonour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. But when for theirown ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that theyare giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought toguard against such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, becausein adversity they always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people oughtto keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only ask notto be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the people, becomesa prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to seek towin the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes themunder his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whomthey were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor; thusthe people quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raisedto the principality by their favours; and the prince can win theiraffections in many ways, but as these vary according to the circumstancesone cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it isnecessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has nosecurity in adversity.

Nabis,^[1]Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a victoriousRoman army, and against them he defended his country and his government; andfor the overcoming of this peril it was only necessary for him to make himselfsecure against a few, but this would not have been sufficient had the peoplebeen hostile. And do not let any one impugn this statement with the triteproverb that “He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,” forthis is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuadeshimself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or bythe magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happenedto the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali^[2]in Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, who cancommand, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail inother qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the wholepeople encouraged—such a one will never find himself deceived in them,and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well.

[1]Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus in 195 B.C.;killed 192 B.C.

[2]Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli’s“Florentine History,” Book III.

These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from thecivil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rulepersonally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government isweaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill ofthose citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially introubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either byintrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid tumultsto exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects,accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of a mind to obeyhim amid these confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times ascarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon whathe observes in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, becausethen every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is fardistant they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when thestate has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much themore is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once.Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizenswill always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the stateand of him, and then he will always find them faithful.

CHAPTER X.
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BEMEASURED

It is necessary to consider another point in examining the character ofthese principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, incase of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether hehas always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite clearI say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by theirown resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise asufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack them;and I consider those always to have need of others who cannot showthemselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to defendthemselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed,but we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one cansay nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and fortifytheir towns, and not on any account to defend the country. And whoevershall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the other concerns ofhis subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated, will neverbe attacked without great caution, for men are always adverse toenterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to bean easy thing to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is nothated by his people.

The cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little countryaround them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits them,nor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, becausethey are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the taking of themby assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they have proper ditchesand walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they always keep in publicdepots enough for one year’s eating, drinking, and firing. And beyondthis, to keep the people quiet and without loss to the state, they alwayshave the means of giving work to the community in those labours that arethe life and strength of the city, and on the pursuit of which the peopleare supported; they also hold military exercises in repute, and moreoverhave many ordinances to uphold them.

Therefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himselfodious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only bedriven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this worldare so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year inthe field without being interfered with. And whoever should reply: If thepeople have property outside the city, and see it burnt, they will notremain patient, and the long siege and self-interest will make them forgettheir prince; to this I answer that a powerful and courageous prince willovercome all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjectsthat the evil will not be for long, at another time fear of the cruelty ofthe enemy, then preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who seemto him to be too bold.

Further, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruinthe country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot andready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the princeto hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage isalready done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any remedy;and therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with their prince,he appearing to be under obligations to them now that their houses havebeen burnt and their possessions ruined in his defence. For it is thenature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by thosethey receive. Therefore, if everything is well considered, it will not bedifficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfastfrom first to last, when he does not fail to support and defend them.

CHAPTER XI.
CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES

It only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touchingwhich all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they areacquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held withouteither; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of religion,which are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the principalitiesmay be held no matter how their princes behave and live. These princesalone have states and do not defend them; and they have subjects and donot rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are not taken fromthem, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, and they haveneither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves. Suchprincipalities only are secure and happy. But being upheld by powers, towhich the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because,being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuousand rash man to discuss them.

Nevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church hasattained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from Alexanderbackwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have been calledpotentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) have valued thetemporal power very slightly—yet now a king of France tremblesbefore it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and to ruin theVenetians—although this may be very manifest, it does not appear tome superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.

Before Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,^[1]this country was under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King ofNaples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had twoprincipal anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms;the other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those aboutwhom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To restrainthe Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as it was for thedefence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made use of the barons ofRome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini and Colonnesi, had always apretext for disorder, and, standing with arms in their hands under the eyes ofthe Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless. And although there mightarise sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune norwisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is alsoa cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a pope,he can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, onepeople should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to theOrsini, who would support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruinthe Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were littleesteemed in Italy.

[1]Charles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.

Alexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that haveever been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to prevail;and through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by reason ofthe entry of the French, he brought about all those things which I havediscussed above in the actions of the duke. And although his intention wasnot to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, nevertheless, what he didcontributed to the greatness of the Church, which, after his death and theruin of the duke, became the heir to all his labours.

Pope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all theRomagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through thechastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the way opento accumulate money in a manner such as had never been practised beforeAlexander’s time. Such things Julius not only followed, but improvedupon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin the Venetians, and to drive theFrench out of Italy. All of these enterprises prospered with him, and so muchthe more to his credit, inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Churchand not any private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factionswithin the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among themsome mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: the one,the greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and the other, notallowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused the disorders among them.For whenever these factions have their cardinals they do not remain quiet forlong, because cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and thebarons are compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelatesarise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his HolinessPope Leo^[2]found the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others madeit great in arms, he will make it still greater and more venerated by hisgoodness and infinite other virtues.

[2]Pope Leo X was the Cardinal de’ Medici.

CHAPTER XII.
HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES

Having discoursed particularly on the characteristics of suchprincipalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and havingconsidered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, andhaving shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and tohold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of offenceand defence which belong to each of them.

We have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have hisfoundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go toruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old orcomposite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good lawswhere the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are wellarmed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussionand shall speak of the arms.

I say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state areeither his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries andauxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based onthese arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited,ambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardlybefore enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, anddestruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one isrobbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no otherattraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which isnot sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to beyour soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselvesoff or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble to prove, for theruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes formany years on mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display andappeared valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showedwhat they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed to seizeItaly with chalk in hand;^[1]and he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but theywere not the sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they werethe sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty.

[1]“With chalk in hand,” “col gesso.” This is one of thebons motsof Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which CharlesVIII seized Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send hisquartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the country.Cf. “The History of Henry VII,” by Lord Bacon: “KingCharles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a kind of afelicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy without resistance: sothat it was true what Pope Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen cameinto Italy with chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, rather thanwith swords to fight.”

I wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The mercenarycaptains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannottrust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either byoppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to yourintentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the usualway.

And if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, whethermercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to, either bya prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in person and performthe duty of a captain; the republic has to send its citizens, and when oneis sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, andwhen one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he does not leave thecommand. And experience has shown princes and republics, single-handed,making the greatest progress, and mercenaries doing nothing except damage;and it is more difficult to bring a republic, armed with its own arms,under the sway of one of its citizens than it is to bring one armed withforeign arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. TheSwitzers are completely armed and quite free.

Of ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who wereoppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans,although the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. After thedeath of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of their soldiersby the Thebans, and after victory he took away their liberty.

Duke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against theVenetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,^[2]allied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father,Sforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna^[3]of Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself intothe arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if theVenetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, andyet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them, Ireply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for ofthe able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have notconquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their ambitionselsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,^[4]and since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one willacknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have stood at hisdiscretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against him, so they watched eachother. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Churchand the kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short whileago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudentman, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this manhad taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for theFlorentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their enemiesthey had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. TheVenetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have actedsafely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when witharmed gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned toenterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook thisvirtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of theirexpansion on land, through not having much territory, and because of theirgreat reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when theyexpanded, as under Carmignuola,^[5]they had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man(they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand,knowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longerconquer under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were theyable, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had acquired,they were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to murder him. They hadafterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino,the count of Pitigliano,^[6]and the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happenedafterwards at Vaila,^[7]where in one battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they hadacquired with so much trouble. Because from such arms conquests come butslowly, long delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.

[2]Battle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.

[3]Johanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.

[4]Giovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John Hawkwood. He foughtin the English wars in France, and was knighted by Edward III; afterwards hecollected a body of troops and went into Italy. These became the famous“White Company.” He took part in many wars, and died in Florence in1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a village in Essex. He marriedDomnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti.

[5]Carmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390, executed atVenice, 5th May 1432.

[6]Bartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San Severino; diedfighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria, in 1487. “Primocapitano in Italia.”—Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano; NicoloOrsini, born 1442, died 1510.

[7]Battle of Vaila in 1509.

And as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled formany years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, in orderthat, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better prepared tocounteract them. You must understand that the empire has recently come tobe repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporal power,and that Italy has been divided up into more states, for the reason thatmany of the great cities took up arms against their nobles, who, formerlyfavoured by the emperor, were oppressing them, whilst the Church wasfavouring them so as to gain authority in temporal power: in many otherstheir citizens became princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fellpartly into the hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Churchconsisting of priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms,both commenced to enlist foreigners.

The first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,^[8]the Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio andSforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After these came all theother captains who till now have directed the arms of Italy; and the end of alltheir valour has been, that she has been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis,ravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Switzers. The principle that hasguided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they mightincrease their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and withoutterritory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry didnot give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with amoderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs werebrought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there werenot to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used everyart to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killingin the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did notattack towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments atnight; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor didthey campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their militaryrules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers;thus they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt.

[8]Alberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in Romagna. He was theleader of the famous “Company of St George,” composed entirely ofItalian soldiers. He died in 1409.

CHAPTER XIII.
CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE’S OWN

Auxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince iscalled in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in themost recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise against Ferrara, had poorproof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand,King of Spain,^[1]for his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good inthemselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous; forlosing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive.

[1]Ferdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples), surnamed “TheCatholic,” born 1452, died 1516.

And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish toleave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which cannotfail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw himselfentirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune broughtabout a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice;because, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the Switzers havingrisen and driven out the conquerors (against all expectation, both his andothers), it so came to pass that he did not become prisoner to hisenemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiliaries, he having conquered byother arms than theirs.

The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand Frenchmento take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other time of theirtroubles.

The Emperor of Constantinople,^[2]to oppose his neighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the warbeing finished, were not willing to quit; this was the beginning of theservitude of Greece to the infidels.

[2]Joannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms,for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them theruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others;but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and betteropportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one community,they are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have madetheir head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injureyou. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; inauxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided thesearms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose with themthan to conquer with the others, not deeming that a real victory which isgained with the arms of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This dukeentered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers,and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces notappearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning lessdanger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, onhandling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, hedestroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference between one andthe other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers thedifference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had theFrench, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his ownsoldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it everincreasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw thathe was complete master of his own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I amunwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I havenamed above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by theSyracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like ourItalian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he couldneither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, andafterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testamentapplicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight withGoliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed himwith his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them on hisback, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet theenemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of otherseither fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you fast.

Charles the Seventh,^[3]the father of King Louis the Eleventh,^[4]having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, recognizedthe necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in hiskingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his son,King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the Switzers, whichmistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to thatkingdom; because, having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirelydiminished the value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantryaltogether; and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being asthey are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear thatthey can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot standagainst the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off wellagainst others. The armies of the French have thus become mixed, partlymercenary and partly national, both of which arms together are much better thanmercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one’s ownforces. And this example proves it, for the kingdom of France would beunconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.

[3]Charles VII of France, surnamed “The Victorious,” born 1403, died1461.

[4]Louis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.

But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks well atfirst, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said above ofhectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality cannot recognize evilsuntil they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and this insight is given tofew. And if the first disaster to the Roman Empire^[5]should be examined, it will be found to have commenced only with the enlistingof the Goths; because from that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began todecline, and all that valour which had raised it passed away to others.

[5]“Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on thereduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of theconditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence. When MrBalfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank under the weightof its military obligations, he said that this was ‘whollyunhistorical.’ He might well have added that the Roman power was at itszenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to fight for the State,but that it began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longerrecognised.”—Pall Mall Gazette, 15th May 1906.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having itsown forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, nothaving the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has alwaysbeen the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertainor unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength. And one’sown forces are those which are composed either of subjects, citizens, ordependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to makeready one’s own forces will be easily found if the rules suggested by meshall be reflected upon, and if one will consider how Philip, the fatherof Alexander the Great, and many republics and princes have armed andorganized themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself.

CHAPTER XIV.
THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR

A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything elsefor his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the soleart that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it notonly upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to risefrom a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen thatwhen princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost theirstates. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; andwhat enables you to acquire a state is to be master of the art. FrancescoSforza, through being martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan;and the sons, through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, fromdukes became private persons. For among other evils which being unarmedbrings you, it causes you to be despised, and this is one of thoseignominies against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shownlater on. Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and theunarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yieldobedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man shouldbe secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one disdainand in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to work welltogether. And therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war,over and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot berespected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never,therefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peacehe should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can doin two ways, the one by action, the other by study.

As regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men wellorganized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which heaccustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature oflocalities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleysopen out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers andmarshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge isuseful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his country, and is betterable to undertake its defence; afterwards, by means of the knowledge andobservation of that locality, he understands with ease any other which itmay be necessary for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys,and plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany,have a certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with aknowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at aknowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks theessential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for itteaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, toarray the battle, to besiege towns to advantage.

Philopoemen,^[1]Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which writers have bestowed on him,is commended because in time of peace he never had anything in his mind but therules of war; and when he was in the country with friends, he often stopped andreasoned with them: “If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we shouldfind ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How shouldone best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat,how ought we to pursue?” And he would set forth to them, as he went, allthe chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their opinion andstate his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these continual discussionsthere could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected circumstances that hecould not deal with.

[1]Philopoemen, “the last of the Greeks,” born 252 B.C., died 183 B.C.

But to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and studythere the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have bornethemselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, soas to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as anillustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised andfamous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in hismind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, CaesarAlexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written byXenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of Scipio how thatimitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability, humanity, andliberality Scipio conformed to those things which have been written ofCyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to observe some such rules, andnever in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources withindustry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, sothat if fortune chances it may find him prepared to resist her blows.

CHAPTER XV.
CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED

It remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a princetowards subject and friends. And as I know that many have written on thispoint, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it again,especially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of otherpeople. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be usefulto him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow upthe real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for many havepictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been knownor seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought tolive, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, soonereffects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to actentirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys himamong so much that is evil.

Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how todo wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. Therefore,putting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, and discussingthose which are real, I say that all men when they are spoken of, andchiefly princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable for some ofthose qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and thus it isthat one is reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (becausean avaricious person in our language is still he who desires to possess byrobbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himself too much of theuse of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, onecompassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate andcowardly, another bold and brave; one affable, another haughty; onelascivious, another chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard,another easy; one grave, another frivolous; one religious, anotherunbelieving, and the like. And I know that every one will confess that itwould be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualitiesthat are considered good; but because they can neither be entirelypossessed nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it isnecessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoidthe reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also tokeep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it;but this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon himselfto them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at incurring areproach for those vices without which the state can only be saved withdifficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, it will be foundthat something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin;whilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings himsecurity and prosperity.

CHAPTER XVI.
CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS

Commencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I saythat it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, liberalityexercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it, injuresyou; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be exercised, itmay not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite.Therefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal isobliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thusinclined will consume in such acts all his property, and will be compelledin the end, if he wish to maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weighdown his people, and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. Thiswill soon make him odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will belittle valued by any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended manyand rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilledby whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishingto draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly.

Therefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of liberalityin such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if he is wise heought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in time he will cometo be more considered than if liberal, seeing that with his economy hisrevenues are enough, that he can defend himself against all attacks, andis able to engage in enterprises without burdening his people; thus itcomes to pass that he exercises liberality towards all from whom he doesnot take, who are numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he doesnot give, who are few.

We have not seen great things done in our time except by those who havebeen considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second wasassisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he didnot strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King ofFrance; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax onhis subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his longthriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken orconquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A prince,therefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he candefend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he is notforced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a reputationfor being mean, for it is one of those vices which will enable him togovern.

And if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and manyothers have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, and bybeing considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, or in away to become one. In the first case this liberality is dangerous, in thesecond it is very necessary to be considered liberal; and Caesar was oneof those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survivedafter becoming so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would havedestroyed his government. And if any one should reply: Many have beenprinces, and have done great things with armies, who have been consideredvery liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends that which is his own or hissubjects’ or else that of others. In the first case he ought to besparing, in the second he ought not to neglect any opportunity forliberality. And to the prince who goes forth with his army, supporting itby pillage, sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others,this liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed bysoldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects’ you can bea ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does nottake away your reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it;it is only squandering your own that injures you.

And there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst youexercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor ordespised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a princeshould guard himself, above all things, against being despised and hated;and liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to have areputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to becompelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to incur a name forrapacity which begets reproach with hatred.

CHAPTER XVII.
CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THANFEARED

Coming now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every princeought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. Nevertheless he oughtto take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel;notwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restoredit to peace and loyalty. And if this be rightly considered, he will be seen tohave been much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid areputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.^[1]Therefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, oughtnot to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will bemore merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise,from which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the wholepeople, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend theindividual only.

[1]During the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi factions in 1502 and1503.

And of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid theimputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. HenceVirgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reignowing to its being new, saying:

“Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.”^[2]

Nevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should hehimself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence andhumanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and toomuch distrust render him intolerable.

[2]. . . against my will, my fate
A throne unsettled, and an infant state,
Bid me defend my realms with all my pow’rs,
And guard with these severities my shores.

Christopher Pitt.

Upon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than fearedor feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both,but, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much saferto be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with.Because this is to be asserted in general of men, that they areungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeedthey are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life,and children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when itapproaches they turn against you. And that prince who, relying entirely ontheir promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; becausefriendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness ornobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and intime of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offendingone who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by thelink of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at everyopportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread ofpunishment which never fails.

Nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he doesnot win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well beingfeared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstainsfrom the property of his citizens and subjects and from their women. Butwhen it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, hemust do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above allthings he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men morequickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.Besides, pretexts for taking away the property are never wanting; for hewho has once begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts forseizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on thecontrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a princeis with his army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then itis quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, forwithout it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties.

Among the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that havingled an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to fight inforeign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or against theprince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This arose from nothingelse than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valour, made himrevered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but without thatcruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect. Andshort-sighted writers admire his deeds from one point of view and fromanother condemn the principal cause of them. That it is true his othervirtues would not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the caseof Scipio, that most excellent man, not only of his own times but withinthe memory of man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain;this arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave hissoldiers more license than is consistent with military discipline. Forthis he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called thecorrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legateof Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of thelegate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someonein the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knewmuch better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. Thisdisposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have destroyedin time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the control ofthe Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, butcontributed to his glory.

Returning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to theconclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearingaccording to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself onthat which is in his own control and not in that of others; he mustendeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.

CHAPTER XVIII.^[1]
CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH

[1]“The present chapter has given greater offence than any other portion ofMachiavelli’s writings.” Burd, “Il Principe,” p. 297.

Every one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to livewith integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been thatthose princes who have done great things have held good faith of littleaccount, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and inthe end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must know thereare two ways of contesting,^[2]the one by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, thesecond to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it isnecessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for aprince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This hasbeen figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe howAchilles and many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron tonurse, who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as theyhad for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for aprince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the otheris not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt thebeast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defendhimself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves.Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion toterrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand whatthey are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith whensuch observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused himto pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would nothold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too arenot bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a princelegitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modernexamples could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have beenmade void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who hasknown best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.

[2]“Contesting,” i.e. “striving for mastery.” MrBurd points out that this passage is imitated directly from Cicero’s“De Officiis”: “Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum perdisceptationem, alterum per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hocbeluarum; confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.”

But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to bea great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject topresent necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone whowill allow himself to be deceived. One recent example I cannot pass over insilence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing else but deceive men, nor ever thoughtof doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was a man whohad greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing,yet would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded accordingto his wishes,^[3]because he well understood this side of mankind.

[3]“Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum).” Thewords “ad votum” are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550.

Alexander never did what he said,
Cesare never said what he did.

Italian Proverb.

Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities Ihave enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And Ishall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe themis injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appearmerciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with amind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able andknow how to change to the opposite.

And you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, cannotobserve all those things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, inorder to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,^[4]friendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to have amind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortuneforce it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he canavoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it.

[4]“Contrary to fidelity” or “faith,” “contro allafede,” and “tutto fede,” “altogether faithful,”in the next paragraph. It is noteworthy that these two phrases, “controalla fede” and “tutto fede,” were omitted in the Testinaedition, which was published with the sanction of the papal authorities. It maybe that the meaning attached to the word “fede” was “thefaith,” i.e. the Catholic creed, and not as rendered here“fidelity” and “faithful.” Observe that the word“religione” was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, beingused to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness “thereligion,” a phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot heresy.South in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as follows:“That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, Nicolo Machiavel, laiddown this for a master rule in his political scheme: ‘That the show ofreligion was helpful to the politician, but the reality of it hurtful andpernicious.’”

For this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anythingslip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named fivequalities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogethermerciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing morenecessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judgegenerally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs toeverybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one seeswhat you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few darenot oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty ofthe state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially ofprinces, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.

For that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holdinghis state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will bepraised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a thingseems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only thevulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no groundto rest on.

One prince^[5]of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything elsebut peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he hadkept it, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time.

[5]Ferdinand of Aragon. “When Machiavelli was writing The Princeitwould have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand’s name herewithout giving offence.” Burd’s “Il Principe,” p. 308.

CHAPTER XIX.
THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED

Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I havespoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss brieflyunder this generality, that the prince must consider, as has been in partsaid before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated orcontemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will havefulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches.

It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, andto be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from both ofwhich he must abstain. And when neither their property nor their honor istouched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to contend withthe ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways.

It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate,mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince should guard himselfas from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his actions greatness,courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with hissubjects let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintainhimself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him orto get round him.

That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, andhe who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, providedit is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people, hecan only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince ought tohave two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the otherfrom without, on account of external powers. From the latter he isdefended by being well armed and having good allies, and if he is wellarmed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quietwithin when they are quiet without, unless they should have been alreadydisturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, ifhe has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as longas he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis theSpartan did.

But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he hasonly to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince caneasily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by keepingthe people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him toaccomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most efficaciousremedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hatedand despised by the people, for he who conspires against a prince alwaysexpects to please them by his removal; but when the conspirator can onlylook forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take sucha course, for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite.And as experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few havebeen successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can hetake a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents, andas soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given himthe material with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he canlook for every advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to beassured, and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he mustbe a very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, tokeep faith with you.

And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side ofthe conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect ofpunishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is themajesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and thestate to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the populargoodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire.For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution ofhis plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime;because on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and thus cannothope for any escape.

Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content withone, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer AnnibaleBentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the present Annibale),having been murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him, not oneof his family survived but Messer Giovanni,^[1]who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination the people rose andmurdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the popular goodwill which thehouse of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in Bologna; which was so great that,although none remained there after the death of Annibale who was able to rulethe state, the Bolognese, having information that there was one of theBentivogli family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the sonof a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of theircity, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to thegovernment.

[1]Giovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He ruled Bolognafrom 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli’s strong condemnation of conspiracies mayget its edge from his own very recent experience (February 1513), when he hadbeen arrested and tortured for his alleged complicity in the Boscoliconspiracy.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies oflittle account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is hostileto him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything andeverybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every carenot to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfiedand contented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince canhave.

Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, andin it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty andsecurity of the king; of these the first is the parliament and itsauthority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of thenobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths wouldbe necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the hatredof the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to protectthem, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of theking; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be liable tofrom the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people forfavouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who couldbeat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the king.Neither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or agreater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can drawanother important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs ofreproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their ownhands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles,but not so as to make himself hated by the people.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths ofthe Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to myopinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great qualitiesof soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been killed bysubjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answerthese objections, I will recall the characters of some of the emperors,and will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to thosealleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for consideration thosethings that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times.

It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to theempire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were Marcus andhis son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son AntoninusCaracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.

There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the ambitionof the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be contendedwith, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up withthe cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset withdifficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing to givesatisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people loved peace,and for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiersloved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and rapacious, whichqualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the people, sothat they could get double pay and give vent to their own greed andcruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors were always overthrown who,either by birth or training, had no great authority, and most of them,especially those who came new to the principality, recognizing thedifficulty of these two opposing humours, were inclined to givesatisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people.Which course was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated bysomeone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by everyone, and when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with theutmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore,those emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adheredmore readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned outadvantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how tomaintain authority over them.

From these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being allmen of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, andbenignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and diedhonoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, andowed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, beingpossessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept bothorders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nordespised.

But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who,being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure thehonest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, having givencause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his oldage, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. Andhere it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works asby bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep hisstate is very often forced to do evil; for when that body is corrupt whomyou think you have need of to maintain yourself—it may be either thepeople or the soldiers or the nobles—you have to submit to itshumours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, thatamong the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in thefourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by himunjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowedhimself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the armyconspired against him, and murdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, AntoninusCaracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-menwho, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind ofiniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to a bad end;but in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiersfriendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reignedsuccessfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of thesoldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished and awedand the former respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of thisman, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew wellhow to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above,it is necessary for a prince to imitate.

Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army inSclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to Romeand avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetoriansoldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to thethrone, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was knownthat he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear,elected him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained forSeverus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, twodifficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, hadcaused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west whereAlbinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he considered itdangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided to attack Nigerand to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, being elected emperorby the Senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and sent himthe title of Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus hiscolleague; which things were accepted by Albinus as true. But afterSeverus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, hereturned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, littlerecognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had by treacherysought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punishhim. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and took from him hisgovernment and life. He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actionsof this man will find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; hewill find him feared and respected by every one, and not hated by thearmy; and it need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to holdthe empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him fromthat hatred which the people might have conceived against him for hisviolence.

But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellentqualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people andacceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring offatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which causedhim to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and crueltieswere so great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, hekilled a large number of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria.He became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those he had aroundhim, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army by acenturion. And here it must be noted that such-like deaths, which aredeliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot beavoided by princes, because any one who does not fear to die can inflictthem; but a prince may fear them the less because they are very rare; hehas only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employsor has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not takenthis care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whomalso he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as itturned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor’s ruin.

But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to holdthe empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he hadonly to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people andsoldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave himself up toamusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge hisrapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity,often descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators, and doingother vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he fell intocontempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and despised bythe other, he was conspired against and was killed.

It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlikeman, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, ofwhom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to thethrone. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hatedand despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought himinto contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a greatindignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to hisdominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the imperialseat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by having,through his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised manycruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness ofhis birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then theSenate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him,to which may be added his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileia andmeeting with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties,and fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, beingthoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring thisdiscourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have thisdifficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a farless degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them someindulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that areveterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were thearmies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary to givesatisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessaryto all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the peoplerather the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful.

From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him twelvethousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend thesecurity and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, puttingaside every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends.The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the hands ofsoldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the people, he mustkeep them his friends. But you must note that the state of the Soldan isunlike all other principalities, for the reason that it is like theChristian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary or anewly formed principality; because the sons of the old prince are not theheirs, but he who is elected to that position by those who have authority,and the sons remain only noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, itcannot be called a new principality, because there are none of thosedifficulties in it that are met with in new ones; for although the princeis new, the constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as toreceive him as if he were its hereditary lord.

But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever willconsider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatalto the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how ithappened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in another,only one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones.Because it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax andAlexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to theprincipality; and likewise it would have been utterly destructive toCaracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated Severus, they nothaving sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his footsteps.Therefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot imitate the actions ofMarcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow those of Severus, but heought to take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found hisstate, and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a statethat may already be stable and firm.

CHAPTER XX.
ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT,ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?

1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed theirsubjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions;others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laidthemselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning oftheir governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown anddestroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all ofthese things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in whicha decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively asthe matter of itself will admit.

2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather whenhe has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by armingthem, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted becomefaithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjectsbecome your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet whenthose whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled morefreely, and this difference in their treatment, which they quiteunderstand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, consideringit to be necessary that those who have the most danger and service shouldhave the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at onceoffend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or forwant of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you.And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn tomercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they shouldbe good they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerfulenemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new princein a new principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full ofexamples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as aprovince to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of thatstate, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and theseagain, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate;and matters should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in thestate shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living nearyou.

3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed tosay that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa byfortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of theirtributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This mayhave been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced, butI do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to-day, becauseI do not believe that factions can ever be of use; rather it is certainthat when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost,because the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and theother will not be able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I believe, bythe above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in theirtributary cities; and although they never allowed them to come tobloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst them, so that thecitizens, distracted by their differences, should not unite against them.Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because, afterthe rout at Vaila, one party at once took courage and seized the state.Such methods argue, therefore, weakness in the prince, because thesefactions will never be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methodsfor enabling one the more easily to manage subjects are only useful intimes of peace, but if war comes this policy proves fallacious.

4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the difficultiesand obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore fortune,especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who has a greaternecessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to ariseand form designs against him, in order that he may have the opportunity ofovercoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which hisenemies have raised. For this reason many consider that a wise prince,when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosityagainst himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise higher.

5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistancein those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than amongthose who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince ofSiena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than byothers. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies somuch with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who at thecommencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of adescription to need assistance to support themselves, can always be gainedover with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve theprince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary forthem to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them;and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from thosewho, serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And sincethe matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means ofsecret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider thereasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not anatural affection towards him, but only discontent with their government,then he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty,for it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasonsfor this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modernaffairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends ofthose men who were contented under the former government, and aretherefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, werefavourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.

6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states moresecurely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit to those whomight design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from a firstattack. I praise this system because it has been made use of formerly.Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen todemolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he might keep that state;Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had beendriven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in thatprovince, and considered that without them it would be more difficult to loseit; the Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses,therefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good inone way they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus: theprince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to buildfortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the peopleought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, hasmade, and will make, more trouble for the house of Sforza than any otherdisorder in the state. For this reason the best possible fortress is—notto be hated by the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yetthey will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wantingforeigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not beenseen in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unlessto the Countess of Forli,^[1]when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she wasable to withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, andthus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time thatthe foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little valueto her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the people, herenemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it would have been safer forher, both then and before, not to have been hated by the people than to havehad the fortresses. All these things considered then, I shall praise him whobuilds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever,trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people.

[1]Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia Landriani, born1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent asenvoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the countess announces theappointment: “I have been with the signori,” wrote Fortunati,“to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me that NicoloMachiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary to my Lords of theTen, is to leave with me at once.” Cf. “CatherineSforza,” by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.

CHAPTER XXI.
HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN

Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting afine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King ofSpain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has risen, by fameand glory, from being an insignificant king to be the foremost king inChristendom; and if you will consider his deeds you will find them allgreat and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign heattacked Granada, and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions.He did this quietly at first and without any fear of hindrance, for heheld the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in thinking of the warand not anticipating any innovations; thus they did not perceive that bythese means he was acquiring power and authority over them. He was ablewith the money of the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, andby that long war to lay the foundation for the military skill which hassince distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so asto undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty todriving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be amore admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak heassailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France;and thus his achievements and designs have always been great, and havekept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied withthe issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out ofthe other, that men have never been given time to work steadily againsthim.

Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internalaffairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da Milano,who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing someextraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method ofrewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a princeought, above all things, always endeavour in every action to gain forhimself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.

A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downrightenemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himselfin favour of one party against the other; which course will always be moreadvantageous than standing neutral; because if two of your powerfulneighbours come to blows, they are of such a character that, if one ofthem conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In either case it willalways be more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make warstrenuously; because, in the first case, if you do not declare yourself,you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure andsatisfaction of him who has been conquered, and you will have no reasonsto offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you. Because he whoconquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the timeof trial; and he who loses will not harbour you because you did notwillingly, sword in hand, court his fate.

Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Ætolians to drive outthe Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of theRomans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the Romansurged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in thecouncil of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to standneutral. To this the Roman legate answered: “As for that which has beensaid, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not tointerfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by notinterfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the guerdonof the conqueror.” Thus it will always happen that he who is not yourfriend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend willentreat you to declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, toavoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and aregenerally ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favourof one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, althoughthe victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he isindebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men arenever so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressingyou. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must notshow some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you allyyourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he mayaid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again.

In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that youhave no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it greaterprudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of one by theaid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him; andconquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with yourassistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted thata prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one morepowerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unlessnecessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are athis discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being atthe discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with France against theDuke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could have beenavoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the Florentineswhen the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then in such acase, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of theparties.

Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safecourses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, becauseit is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one troublewithout running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how todistinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesserevil.

A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour theproficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his citizensto practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and agriculture,and in every other following, so that the one should not be deterred fromimproving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away from him oranother from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the prince ought tooffer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and designs in any wayto honour his city or state.

Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles atconvenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into guilds orinto societies,^[1]he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, andshow himself an example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, alwaysmaintaining the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate inanything.

[1]“Guilds or societies,” “in arti o in tribu.”“Arti” were craft or trade guilds, cf. Florio:“Arte . . . a whole company of any trade in any city or corporationtown.” The guilds of Florence are most admirably described by Mr EdgcumbeStaley in his work on the subject (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhatsimilar character, called “artel,” exist in Russia to-day,cf. Sir Mackenzie Wallace’s “Russia,” ed. 1905:“The sons . . . were always during the working season members of anartel. In some of the larger towns there are artels of a much more complexkind— permanent associations, possessing large capital, and pecuniarilyresponsible for the acts of the individual members.” The word“artel,” despite its apparent similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maudeassures me, no connection with “ars” or “arte.” Itsroot is that of the verb “rotisya,” to bind oneself by an oath; andit is generally admitted to be only another form of “rota,” whichnow signifies a “regimental company.” In both words the underlyingidea is that of a body of men united by an oath. “Tribu” werepossibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included individualsconnected by marriage. Perhaps our words “sects” or“clans” would be most appropriate.

CHAPTER XXII.
CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES

The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and theyare good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And thefirst opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is byobserving the men he has around him; and when they are capable andfaithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how torecognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they areotherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error whichhe made was in choosing them.

There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant ofPandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to bea very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there arethree classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; anotherwhich appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which neithercomprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is the mostexcellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore, it followsnecessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he was in thesecond, for whenever one has judgment to know good and bad when it is saidand done, although he himself may not have the initiative, yet he canrecognize the good and the bad in his servant, and the one he can praiseand the other correct; thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and iskept honest.

But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one testwhich never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his owninterests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit ineverything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you everbe able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his handsought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and never payany attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned.

On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to studyhim, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with himthe honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he cannotstand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, manyriches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him dreadchances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, are thusdisposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, the endwill always be disastrous for either one or the other.

CHAPTER XXIII.
HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED

I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it isa danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless they arevery careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of whom courtsare full, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and ina way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty fromthis pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger offalling into contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneselffrom flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truthdoes not offend you; but when every one may tell you the truth, respectfor you abates.

Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wisemen in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking thetruth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and ofnone others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen totheir opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With thesecouncillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself insuch a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shallspeak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listento no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in hisresolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, oris so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt.

I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of affairsto Maximilian,^[1]the present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said: He consulted with no one,yet never got his own way in anything. This arose because of his following apractice the opposite to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man—hedoes not communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions onthem. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, theyare at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, beingpliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he does oneday he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intendsto do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.

[1]Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. Hemarried, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after her death, BiancaSforza; and thus became involved in Italian politics.

A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishesand not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one fromoffering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a constantinquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of whichhe inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has nottold him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.

And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression ofhis wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the goodadvisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, becausethis is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise himselfwill never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairsentirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In this caseindeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long, because sucha governor would in a short time take away his state from him.

But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from morethan one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to unitethem. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and theprince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And theyare not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue to youunless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be inferredthat good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of theprince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels.

CHAPTER XXIV.
WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES

The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince toappear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed inthe state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of a newprince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, andwhen they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter thanancient blood; because men are attracted more by the present than by thepast, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek nofurther; they will also make the utmost defence of a prince if he failsthem not in other things. Thus it will be a double glory for him to haveestablished a new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with goodlaws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be adouble disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want ofwisdom.

And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in Italyin our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others,there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in regard to armsfrom the causes which have been discussed at length; in the next place,some one of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, orif he has had the people friendly, he has not known how to secure thenobles. In the absence of these defects states that have power enough tokeep an army in the field cannot be lost.

Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who wasconquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to thegreatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being awarlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, hesustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the end helost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the kingdom.

Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of theirprincipalities after so many years’ possession, but rather their ownsloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change(it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calmagainst the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they thoughtof flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that the people,disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall them. Thiscourse, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to haveneglected all other expedients for that, since you would never wish tofall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to restoreyou. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will not be foryour security, because that deliverance is of no avail which does notdepend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and durable thatdepend on yourself and your valour.

CHAPTER XXV.
WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER

It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the opinion thatthe affairs of the world are in such wise governed by fortune and by God thatmen with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one can even help them;and because of this they would have us believe that it is not necessary tolabour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinion has beenmore credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which havebeen seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture.Sometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true thatFortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,^[1]but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a littleless.

[1]Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: “The older one gets the moreconvinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does three-quarters of thebusiness of this miserable universe.” Sorel’s “EasternQuestion.”

I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflowsthe plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away the soil fromplace to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its violence,without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its naturebe such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomesfair, shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers, in such amanner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and theirforce be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens withfortune, who shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her,and thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers anddefences have not been raised to constrain her.

And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, andwhich has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an opencountry without barriers and without any defence. For if it had beendefended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either thisinvasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it would nothave come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning resistanceto fortune in general.

But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may beseen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change ofdisposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes thathave already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who reliesentirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that he willbe successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of thetimes, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not besuccessful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end whichevery man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there byvarious methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force,another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each onesucceeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see oftwo cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly,two men by different observances are equally successful, the one beingcautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else thanwhether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times.This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently bringabout the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains hisobject and the other does not.

Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs himselfwith caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a way thathis administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if times andaffairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of action.But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know how toaccommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate fromwhat nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always prosperedby acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it;and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous,does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed hisconduct with the times fortune would not have changed.

Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, andfound the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of actionthat he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise againstBologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians werenot agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the enterprisestill under discussion with the King of France; nevertheless he personallyentered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness and energy, amove which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute and passive, thelatter from fear, the former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples;on the other hand, he drew after him the King of France, because thatking, having observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope hisfriend so as to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him.Therefore Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no otherpontiff with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited inRome until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everythingfixed, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never havesucceeded. Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses,and the others would have raised a thousand fears.

I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they allsucceeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience thecontrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to gocautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never havedeviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.

I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfastin their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, butunsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is betterto be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if youwish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it isseen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather thanby those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always,woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, moreviolent, and with more audacity command her.

CHAPTER XXVI.
AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS

Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, andwondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a newprince, and whether there were elements that would give an opportunity toa wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of things which would dohonour to him and good to the people of this country, it appears to methat so many things concur to favour a new prince that I never knew a timemore fit than the present.

And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should becaptive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persiansshould be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of thesoul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustratethe capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order todiscover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italyshould be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should bemore enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, morescattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten,despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation.

Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us thinkhe was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was afterwardsseen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him; so thatItaly, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal her woundsand put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy, to theswindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse thosesores that for long have festered. It is seen how she entreats God to sendsomeone who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous insolencies.It is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a banner if onlysomeone will raise it.

Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope than inyour illustrious house,^[1]with its valour and fortune, favoured by God and by the Church of which it isnow the chief, and which could be made the head of this redemption. This willnot be difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of themen I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet they weremen, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, fortheir enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was God moretheir friend than He is yours.

[1]Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X. In 1523Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII.

With us there is great justice, because that war is just which isnecessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in them.Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness is greatthe difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those men to whomI have directed your attention. Further than this, how extraordinarily theways of God have been manifested beyond example: the sea is divided, acloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth water, it has rainedmanna, everything has contributed to your greatness; you ought to do therest. God is not willing to do everything, and thus take away our freewill and that share of glory which belongs to us.

And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians havebeen able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious house;and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many campaigns, it hasalways appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has happenedbecause the old order of things was not good, and none of us have knownhow to find a new one. And nothing honours a man more than to establishnew laws and new ordinances when he himself was newly risen. Such thingswhen they are well founded and dignified will make him revered andadmired, and in Italy there are not wanting opportunities to bring suchinto use in every form.

Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. Lookattentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior theItalians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But when it comes to armiesthey do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from the insufficiencyof the leaders, since those who are capable are not obedient, and each oneseems to himself to know, there having never been any one so distinguishedabove the rest, either by valour or fortune, that others would yield to him.Hence it is that for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the pasttwenty years, whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has alwaysgiven a poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro,afterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.^[2]

[2]The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501; Genoa, 1507;Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513.

If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkablemen who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things, asa true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your ownforces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better soldiers.And although singly they are good, altogether they will be much betterwhen they find themselves commanded by their prince, honoured by him, andmaintained at his expense. Therefore it is necessary to be prepared withsuch arms, so that you can be defended against foreigners by Italianvalour.

And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very formidable,nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which a third orderwould not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied upon tooverthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the Switzersare afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close combat. Owingto this, as has been and may again be seen, the Spaniards are unable toresist French cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrown by Spanishinfantry. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot be shown,nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, whenthe Spanish infantry were confronted by German battalions, who follow thesame tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and withthe aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and stoodout of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood helpless, and, ifthe cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with them. It ispossible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these infantries, toinvent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry;this need not create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old.And these are the kind of improvements which confer reputation and powerupon a new prince.

This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for lettingItaly at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love withwhich he would be received in all those provinces which have suffered somuch from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for revenge, with whatstubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. What door would beclosed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? What envy would hinderhim? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all of us this barbarousdominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious house take up thischarge with that courage and hope with which all just enterprises areundertaken, so that under its standard our native country may be ennobled,and under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch:

Virtu contro al Furore
    Prendera l’arme, e fia il combatter corto:
Che l’antico valore
    Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.

Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,
    And it i’ th’ combat soon shall put to flight:
For the old Roman valour is not dead,
    Nor in th’ Italians’ brests extinguished.

Edward Dacre, 1640.

DESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKEVALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNORPAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI

BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI

The Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to clearhimself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been raisedagainst him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of Arezzo andother towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, whence heintended with his army to enter upon the campaign against GiovanniBentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring that cityunder his domination, and to make it the head of his Romagnian duchy.

These matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and theirfollowing, it appeared to them that the duke would become too powerful,and it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek to destroythem in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon this a meetingwas called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to which came thecardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, Vitellozzo Vitelli,Oliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the tyrant of Perugia, andMesser Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo Petrucci, the Prince of Siena.Here were discussed the power and courage of the duke and the necessity ofcurbing his ambitions, which might otherwise bring danger to the rest ofbeing ruined. And they decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but tostrive to win over the Florentines; and they sent their men to one placeand another, promising to one party assistance and to anotherencouragement to unite with them against the common enemy. This meetingwas at once reported throughout all Italy, and those who were discontentedunder the duke, among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope ofeffecting a revolution.

Thus it arose that, men’s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided bycertain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held forthe duke, and which they captured by the following means. The castellanwas fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there; so theconspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being carried tothe rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from being drawnup by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping upon the bridgeand thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being effected, the wholestate rebelled and recalled the old duke, being encouraged in this, not somuch by the capture of the fort, as by the Diet at Magione, from whom theyexpected to get assistance.

Those who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose theopportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any town,should any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and they sentagain to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in destroying thecommon firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and that they oughtnot to wait for another opportunity.

But the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli andOrsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo Machiavelli,their secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the duke against hisenemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, because, againsteverybody’s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone over to the enemyand he found himself disarmed and war at his door. But recovering couragefrom the offers of the Florentines, he decided to temporize beforefighting with the few soldiers that remained to him, and to negotiate fora reconciliation, and also to get assistance. This latter he obtained intwo ways, by sending to the King of France for men and by enlistingmen-at-arms and others whom he turned into cavalry of a sort: to all hegave money.

Notwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approachedFossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the aidof the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the dukeresolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with offers ofreconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did not fail in anypractices to make the insurgents understand that he wished every man whohad acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough for him to have thetitle of prince, whilst others might have the principality.

And the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to himto negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to astandstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took everycare to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that suchpreparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops inseparate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there camealso to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found himselfsufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open war, heconsidered that it would be safer and more advantageous to outwit them,and for this reason he did not stop the work of reconciliation.

And that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them inwhich he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousandducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed analliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to comepersonally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the otherhand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and other placesseized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and not to make waragainst or ally themselves with any one without his permission.

This reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino,again fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in hisstate; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that thefortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by theenemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends. Butthe Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed hismen throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of Novembertogether with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to Cesena, where hestayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the Vitelli and Orsini,who had assembled with their men in the duchy of Urbino, as to theenterprise in which they should now take part; but nothing beingconcluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that if the duke wishedto undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were ready; if he did notwish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To this the duke replied thathe did not wish to enter into war with Tuscany, and thus become hostile tothe Florentines, but that he was very willing to proceed againstSinigalia.

It happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but thefortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give itup to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to comethere. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being invited bythem, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no suspicions. Andthe more to reassure them, he allowed all the French men-at-arms who werewith him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred lancers under Mons. diCandales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena about the middle of December,and went to Fano, and with the utmost cunning and cleverness he persuadedthe Vitelli and Orsini to wait for him at Sinigalia, pointing out to themthat any lack of compliance would cast a doubt upon the sincerity andpermanency of the reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to makeuse of the arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained verystubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should notoffend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded byPagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, heagreed to wait.

Upon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most trustedfollowers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor d’Euna, who wasafterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as Vitellozzo, PagoloOrsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should arrive, his followersin pairs should take them one by one, entrusting certain men to certainpairs, who should entertain them until they reached Sinigalia; nor shouldthey be permitted to leave until they came to the duke’s quarters, wherethey should be seized.

The duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which therewere more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to assembleby daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from Fano, andawait him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day of Decemberat the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of about twohundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the infantry, whom heaccompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms.

Fano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of theAdriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who goestowards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases of whichare touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia is distantfrom the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot and from theshore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs a little riverwhich bathes that part of the walls looking towards Fano, facing the highroad. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes for a good space by roadalong the mountains, and reaches the river which passes by Sinigalia. Ifhe turns to his left hand along the bank of it, and goes for the distanceof a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge which crosses the river; he is thenalmost abreast of the gate that leads into Sinigalia, not by a straightline, but transversely. Before this gate there stands a collection ofhouses with a square to which the bank of the river forms one side.

The Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and tohonour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant fromSinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men of theduke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band, whichconsisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty horsemen, whowere quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters having been thusarranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and when the leaders ofthe cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass over, but having openedit, one portion wheeled towards the river and the other towards thecountry, and a way was left in the middle through which the infantrypassed, without stopping, into the town.

Vitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a fewhorsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a capelined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of hisapproaching death—a circumstance which, in view of the ability ofthe man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said thatwhen he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet theduke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He recommended hishouse and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his nephews that itwas not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of their fathers thatshould be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came before the duke andsaluted him respectfully, and were received by him with goodwill; theywere at once placed between those who were commissioned to look afterthem.

But the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band inSinigalia, was missing—for Oliverotto was waiting in the squarebefore his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and drillingthem—signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care ofOliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures thatOliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joinedOliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of theirquarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke; and headvised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come himself tomeet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice, came before theduke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and Oliverotto, having made hisobeisance, joined the others.

So the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke’s quarters,and went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made themprisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that the men ofOliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. Those ofOliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of the Orsiniand Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment of thedestruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, and bearingin mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and Vitellian houses,they stood together against the hostile forces of the country and savedthemselves.

But the duke’s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men ofOliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not repressedthis outrage by killing some of them they would have completely sacked it.Night having come and the tumult being silenced, the duke prepared to killVitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a room and caused them to bestrangled. Neither of them used words in keeping with their past lives:Vitellozzo prayed that he might ask of the pope full pardon for his sins;Oliverotto cringed and laid the blame for all injuries against the duke onVitellozzo. Pagolo and the Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive untilthe duke heard from Rome that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, theArchbishop of Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After whichnews, on 18th January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also werestrangled in the same way.

THE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA

WRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI

And sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI

CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328

It appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who haveconsidered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them, whohave performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in theirday, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and obscurity; or havebeen aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way. They have either beenexposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have had so mean a parentagethat in shame they have given themselves out to be sons of Jove or of someother deity. It would be wearisome to relate who these persons may havebeen because they are well known to everybody, and, as such tales wouldnot be particularly edifying to those who read them, they are omitted. Ibelieve that these lowly beginnings of great men occur because Fortune isdesirous of showing to the world that such men owe much to her and littleto wisdom, because she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really takeno part in their career: thus all success must be attributed to her.Castruccio Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds,if he is measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which hewas born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nordistinguished in his birth, as the course of this history will show. Itappeared to be desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned inhim such indications of valour and fortune as should make him a greatexemplar to men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to hisactions, because you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds.

The family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families ofLucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in estate,as so often happens in this world. To this family was born a son Antonio,who became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca, and for thisreason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He had an onlysister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but Buonaccorso dyingshe became a widow, and not wishing to marry again went to live with herbrother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the house where he resided,and as it was bounded on all sides by gardens, any person could haveaccess to it without difficulty. One morning, shortly after sunrise,Madonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio was called, had occasionto go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning the dinner,and hearing a slight rustling among the leaves of a vine she turned hereyes in that direction, and heard something resembling the cry of aninfant. Whereupon she went towards it, and saw the hands and face of ababy who was lying enveloped in the leaves and who seemed to be crying forits mother. Partly wondering and partly fearing, yet full of compassion,she lifted it up and carried it to the house, where she washed it andclothed it with clean linen as is customary, and showed it to MesserAntonio when he returned home. When he heard what had happened and saw thechild he was not less surprised or compassionate than his sister. Theydiscussed between themselves what should be done, and seeing that he waspriest and that she had no children, they finally determined to bring itup. They had a nurse for it, and it was reared and loved as if it weretheir own child. They baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccioafter their father. As the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, andgave evidence of wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyondhis years those lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. MesserAntonio intended to make a priest of him, and in time would have inductedhim into his canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction wasgiven with this object; but Antonio discovered that the character ofCastruccio was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccioreached the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding ofMesser Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left offreading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, delightingin nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in running, leaping, andwrestling with other boys. In all exercises he far excelled his companionsin courage and bodily strength, and if at any time he did turn to books,only those pleased him which told of wars and the mighty deeds of men.Messer Antonio beheld all this with vexation and sorrow.

There lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, namedMesser Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, bodilystrength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had often foughtunder the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a Ghibelline was thevalued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman resided in Lucca andwas accustomed to assemble with others most mornings and evenings underthe balcony of the Podesta, which is at the top of the square of SanMichele, the finest square in Lucca, and he had often seen Castrucciotaking part with other children of the street in those games of which Ihave spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far excelled the other boys, andthat he appeared to exercise a royal authority over them, and that theyloved and obeyed him, Messer Francesco became greatly desirous of learningwho he was. Being informed of the circumstances of the bringing up ofCastruccio he felt a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore hecalled him one day and asked him whether he would more willingly live inthe house of a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and usearms, or in the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but massesand the services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleasedCastruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he stoodsilent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer Francesco tospeak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable, nothing wouldplease him more than to give up his priestly studies and take up those ofa soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and in a very short timehe obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was driven to yield by hisknowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear that he would not be ableto hold him much longer.

Thus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to thehouse of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was astonishing tofind that in a very short time he manifested all that virtue and bearingwhich we are accustomed to associate with a true gentleman. In the firstplace he became an accomplished horseman, and could manage with ease themost fiery charger, and in all jousts and tournaments, although still ayouth, he was observed beyond all others, and he excelled in all exercisesof strength and dexterity. But what enhanced so much the charm of theseaccomplishments, was the delightful modesty which enabled him to avoidoffence in either act or word to others, for he was deferential to thegreat men, modest with his equals, and courteous to his inferiors. Thesegifts made him beloved, not only by all the Guinigi family, but by allLucca. When Castruccio had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellineswere driven from Pavia by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent bythe Visconti to assist the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, incharge of his forces. Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence andcourage in this expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any othercaptain, and his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, butthroughout all Lombardy.

Castruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he leftit, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many friendsas he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary for thatpurpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son thirteenyears of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to be his son’stutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died Francesco calledCastruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that goodwill which he(Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to the son thegratitude which he had not been able to repay to the father. Upon thedeath of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and tutor of Pagolo,which increased enormously his power and position, and created a certainamount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the former universalgoodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring tyrannical intentions.Among these the leading man was Giorgio degli Opizi, the head of theGuelph party. This man hoped after the death of Messer Francesco to becomethe chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him that Castruccio, with thegreat abilities which he already showed, and holding the position ofgovernor, deprived him of his opportunity; therefore he began to sow thoseseeds which should rob Castruccio of his eminence. Castruccio at firsttreated this with scorn, but afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking thatMesser Giorgio might be able to bring him into disgrace with the deputy ofKing Ruberto of Naples and have him driven out of Lucca.

The Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo,who being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became theirlord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca, with whomCastruccio held communications with the object of effecting theirrestoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought into hisplans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of the Opizi.Having fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio cautiously fortifiedthe tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies and munitions of war, inorder that it might stand a siege for a few days in case of need. When thenight came which had been agreed upon with Uguccione, who had occupied theplain between the mountains and Pisa with many men, the signal was given,and without being observed Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero andset fire to the portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within thecity, calling the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side.Uguccione entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed MesserGiorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. Thegovernor was driven out, and the government reformed according to thewishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was foundthat more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those whofled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was theheadquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became mosthostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese.

As it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party thatthe Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they determined torestore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a large army in theVal di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence they marched toMontecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into Lucca. Upon thisUguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and with a number ofGerman cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved against thequarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the enemy withdrewfrom Montecarlo, and posted themselves between Montecatini and Pescia.Uguccione now took up a position near to Montecarlo, and within about twomiles of the enemy, and slight skirmishes between the horse of bothparties were of daily occurrence. Owing to the illness of Uguccione, thePisans and Lucchese delayed coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione,finding himself growing worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and leftthe command of the army in the hands of Castruccio. This change broughtabout the ruin of the Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army havinglost its captain had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccioobserved this, and allowed some days to pass in order to encourage thisbelief; he also showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of themunitions of the camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew moreinsolent the more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day theydrew out in the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio.Presently, deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and havingmastered their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First hespoke a few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out tothem the certainty of victory if they would but obey his commands.Castruccio had noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in thecentre of the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings ofthe army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiantmen on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely hemoved to the centre. Observing this order of battle, he drew out of hislines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, hadcome in their insolence to defy him. He then commanded his centresquadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on thewings. Thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings ofthe two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained outof action, for these two portions of the line of battle were separatedfrom each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach each other. Bythis expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio’s men were opposed tothe weaker part of the enemy’s troops, and the most efficient men of theenemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines were unable to fight withthose who were arrayed opposite to them, or to give any assistance totheir own flanks. So, without much difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy toflight on both flanks, and the centre battalions took to flight when theyfound themselves exposed to attack, without having a chance of displayingtheir valour. The defeat was complete, and the loss in men very heavy,there being more than ten thousand men killed with many officers andknights of the Guelph party in Tuscany, and also many princes who had cometo help them, among whom were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, andCarlo, his nephew, and Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part ofCastruccio the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men, amongwhom was Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, waskilled in the first onset.

This victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio thatUguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because itappeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase ofpower, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only waitedfor an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the death ofPier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in Lucca, themurderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge. On thesergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were drivenoff by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming to theknowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him a properopportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his son Neri, whowas the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take Castruccioprisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio, fearing no evil,went to the governor in a friendly way, was entertained at supper, andthen thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing to put him to death lest thepeople should be incensed, kept him alive, in order to hear further fromhis father concerning his intentions. Ugucionne cursed the hesitation andcowardice of his son, and at once set out from Pisa to Lucca with fourhundred horsemen to finish the business in his own way; but he had not yetreached the baths when the Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death andcreated Count Gaddo della Gherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reachedLucca he heard of the occurrences at Pisa, but it did not appear wise tohim to turn back, lest the Lucchese with the example of Pisa before themshould close their gates against him. But the Lucchese, having heard ofwhat had happened at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity todemand the liberation of Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione hadarrived in their city. They first began to speak of it in private circles,afterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised a tumult,and with arms in their hands went to Uguccione and demanded thatCastruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse mighthappen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered hisfriends around him, and with the help of the people attacked Uguccione;who, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away with his friendsto Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in poverty.

But Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca, andhe carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people that theyappointed him captain of their army for one year. Having obtained this,and wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the recovery of the manytowns which had rebelled after the departure of Uguccione, and with thehelp of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded a treaty, he marched toSerezzana. To capture this place he constructed a fort against it, whichis called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course of two months Castrucciocaptured the town. With the reputation gained at that siege, he rapidlyseized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in a short time had overrun thewhole of Lunigiana. In order to close the pass which leads from Lombardyto Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and wrested it from the hands ofMesser Anastagio Palavicini, who was the lord of it. After this victory hereturned to Lucca, and was welcomed by the whole people. And nowCastruccio, deeming it imprudent any longer to defer making himself aprince, got himself created the lord of Lucca by the help of Pazzino delPoggio, Puccinello dal Portico, Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi,all of whom he had corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly anddeliberately elected prince by the people. At this time Frederick ofBavaria, the King of the Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperialcrown, and Castruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, methim at the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had left as hisdeputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high estimation, becauseof the people’s love for the memory of his father. Castruccio was receivedin great honour by Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him,and he was appointed the emperor’s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time thePisans were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had drivenout of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick. Frederickcreated Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread of theGuelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were constrained toaccept him as their lord.

Frederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italianaffairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian Ghibellines,who followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio for help andcounsel, and all promised him the governorship of his country, if enabledto recover it with his assistance. Among these exiles were Matteo Guidi,Nardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, and Piero Buonaccorsi, allexiled Florentines and Ghibellines. Castruccio had the secret intention ofbecoming the master of all Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his ownforces; and in order to gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into aleague with Messer Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized forhim the forces of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had fivegates, he divided his own country districts into five parts, which hesupplied with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, sothat he could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers,without those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While hesurrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at MesserMatteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had drivenout the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army and the KingRuberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the Florentines intheir own territories, so that, being attacked at home, they should becompelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to defendthemselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized Fucecchio and SanMiniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country. Whereupon theFlorentines recalled their army, which had scarcely reached Tuscany, whenCastruccio was forced by other necessities to return to Lucca.

There resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so powerfulthat they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance him to thedignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not received suchrewards for their services as they deserved, they incited other familiesto rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They found theiropportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set upon thelieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and killed him. Theyendeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano di Poggio, apeaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion, intervened andcompelled them by his authority to lay down their arms; and he offered tobe their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him what they desired.Therefore they laid down their arms with no greater intelligence than theyhad taken them up. Castruccio, having heard the news of what had happenedat Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi in command of the army, and with atroop of cavalry set out for home. Contrary to his expectations, he foundthe rebellion at an end, yet he posted his men in the most advantageousplaces throughout the city. As it appeared to Stefano that Castruccioought to be very much obliged to him, he sought him out, and withoutsaying anything on his own behalf, for he did not recognize any need fordoing so, he begged Castruccio to pardon the other members of his familyby reason of their youth, their former friendships, and the obligationswhich Castruccio was under to their house. To this Castruccio graciouslyresponded, and begged Stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gavehim more pleasure to find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused himanxiety to hear of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring hisfamily to him, saying that he thanked God for having given him theopportunity of showing his clemency and liberality. Upon the word ofStefano and Castruccio they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediatelythrown into prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines hadrecovered San Miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to makepeace, as it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure atLucca to leave him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of atruce, which they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, anddesirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded withthem for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the conqueststhey had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, turned hisattention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should not again besubject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, under variouspretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by their ambitionmight aspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, but deprivingthem of country and property, and those whom he had in his hands of lifealso, stating that he had found by experience that none of them were to betrusted. Then for his further security he raised a fortress in Lucca withthe stones of the towers of those whom he had killed or hunted out of thestate.

Whilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened hisposition in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, ofincreasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he couldget possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, which washis great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends with themountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both parties confidedtheir secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it always had been, into theBianchi and Neri parties; the head of the Bianchi was Bastiano diPossente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each of these men held secretcommunications with Castruccio, and each desired to drive the other out ofthe city; and, after many threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopofortified himself at the Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Luccheseside of the city; both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines,because they believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing tofight than the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. Hegave promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person,and to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At theappointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himselfdirect to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and bothwere admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a signalgiven by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other Bastiano diPossente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans of eitherfaction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the hands ofCastruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the palace, compelledthe people to yield obedience to him, making them many promises andremitting their old debts. The countryside flocked to the city to see thenew prince, and all were filled with hope and quickly settled down,influenced in a great measure by his great valour.

About this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness ofliving which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon. TheGerman governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened—murdersand tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put anend to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should callin Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of thecity, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he couldapply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not only togive him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome. Castruccioconsidered that he ought not to hesitate to render the emperor thisservice, because he believed that he himself would not be safe if at anytime the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command atLucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six hundred horsemen, where he wasreceived by Enrico with the greatest distinction. In a short time thepresence of Castruccio obtained such respect for the emperor that, withoutbloodshed or violence, good order was restored, chiefly by reason ofCastruccio having sent by sea from the country round Pisa large quantitiesof corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble. When he had chastisedsome of the Roman leaders, and admonished others, voluntary obedience wasrendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many honours, and was made a Romansenator. This dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio beingclothed in a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered onits front: “I am what God wills.” Whilst on the back was: “What Goddesires shall be.”

During this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccioshould have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they couldtempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be difficultin his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were Baldo Cecchiand Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face danger. Thesemen kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia, and with the aidof the Florentines entered the city by night, and after driving out someof Castruccio’s officials and partisans, and killing others, they restoredthe city to its freedom. The news of this greatly angered Castruccio, andtaking leave of Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. When theFlorentines heard of his return, knowing that he would lose no time, theydecided to intercept him with their forces in the Val di Nievole, underthe belief that by doing so they would cut off his road to Pistoia.Assembling a great army of the supporters of the Guelph cause, theFlorentines entered the Pistoian territories. On the other hand,Castruccio reached Montecarlo with his army; and having heard where theFlorentines’ lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains of Pistoia,nor to await it in the plains of Pescia, but, as far as he possibly could,to attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He believed that if hesucceeded in this design, victory was assured, although he was informedthat the Florentines had thirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelvethousand. Although he had every confidence in his own abilities and thevalour of his troops, yet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the openlest he should be overwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle betweenPescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nievole,not in the exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is inplaces narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is stillnarrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that twentymen side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was Manfred, aGerman, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed toremain in possession of the castle, it being common to the Lucchese andthe Pistoians, and unclaimed by either—neither of them wishing todisplace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of neutrality, and cameunder obligations to no one. For these reasons, and also because thecastle was well fortified, he had always been able to maintain hisposition. It was here that Castruccio had determined to fall upon hisenemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and there was nofear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force before they becameengaged, they should not stand. As soon as this trouble with Florencearose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which possession of thiscastle would give him, and having an intimate friendship with a residentin the castle, he managed matters so with him that four hundred of his menwere to be admitted into the castle the night before the attack on theFlorentines, and the castellan put to death.

Castruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage theFlorentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away fromPistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his army fromMontecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they reached theirencampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill on the followingmorning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the castle at night, hadalso moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching from thence at midnightin dead silence, had reached the foot of Serravalle: thus he and theFlorentines commenced the ascent of the hill at the same time in themorning. Castruccio sent forward his infantry by the main road, and atroop of four hundred horsemen by a path on the left towards the castle.The Florentines sent forward four hundred cavalry ahead of their armywhich was following, never expecting to find Castruccio in possession ofthe hill, nor were they aware of his having seized the castle. Thus ithappened that the Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completelytaken by surprise when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and soclose were they upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors.It was a case of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they wereassailed with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own,although some few of them got through. When the noise of the fightingreached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. Thecavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were unableto get their men either backward or forward, owing to the narrowness ofthe pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought to be done orwhat could be done. In a short time the cavalry who were engaged with theenemy’s infantry were scattered or killed without having made anyeffective defence because of their unfortunate position, although in sheerdesperation they had offered a stout resistance. Retreat had beenimpossible, with the mountains on both flanks, whilst in front were theirenemies, and in the rear their friends. When Castruccio saw that his menwere unable to strike a decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight,he sent one thousand infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to jointhe four hundred horsemen he had previously dispatched there, andcommanded the whole force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. Theseorders they carried out with such fury that the Florentines could notsustain the attack, but gave way, and were soon in full retreat—conqueredmore by their unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy.Those in the rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains,each man seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and verysanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were Bandinidei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all Florentinenoblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on the Florentineside, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the Guelphs. Immediatelythe Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out the friends of theGuelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not content with occupyingPrato and all the castles on the plains on both sides of the Arno, butmarched his army into the plain of Peretola, about two miles fromFlorence. Here he remained many days, dividing the spoils, and celebratinghis victory with feasts and games, holding horse races, and foot races formen and women. He also struck medals in commemoration of the defeat of theFlorentines. He endeavoured to corrupt some of the citizens of Florence,who were to open the city gates at night; but the conspiracy wasdiscovered, and the participators in it taken and beheaded, among whomwere Tommaso Lupacci and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused theFlorentines great anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty,they sent envoys to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion oftheir city; and he, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance ofthe Guelph cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentinesto receive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, andhe sent his son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen.

Shortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of thepressure of Castruccio’s army, owing to his being compelled to leave hispositions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress aconspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, oneof the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland shouldbe under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this conspiracy,intending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of Castruccio, anddrive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy paucity of numbers isessential to secrecy, so for its execution a few are not sufficient, andin seeking more adherents to his conspiracy Lanfranchi encountered aperson who revealed the design to Castruccio. This betrayal cannot bepassed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi,two Florentine exiles who were suffering their banishment in Pisa.Thereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put him to death, and beheadedmany other noble citizens, and drove their families into exile. It nowappeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and Pistoia were thoroughlydisaffected; he employed much thought and energy upon securing hisposition there, and this gave the Florentines their opportunity toreorganize their army, and to await the coming of Carlo, the son of theKing of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided to lose no more time, andassembled a great army of more than thirty thousand infantry and tenthousand cavalry—having called to their aid every Guelph there wasin Italy. They consulted whether they should attack Pistoia or Pisa first,and decided that it would be better to march on the latter—a course,owing to the recent conspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of moreadvantage to them, because they believed that the surrender of Pistoiawould follow the acquisition of Pisa.

In the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army andquickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from thenceon to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army which theFlorentines were sending against him, he was in no degree alarmed,believing that the time had now arrived when Fortune would deliver theempire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to think that hisenemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects of success, thanat Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand foot soldiers and fourthousand horsemen, and with this army went to Fucecchio, whilst he sentPagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand infantry. Fucecchio has astronger position than any other town in the Pisan district, owing to itssituation between the rivers Arno and Gusciana and its slight elevationabove the surrounding plain. Moreover, the enemy could not hinder itsbeing victualled unless they divided their forces, nor could they approachit either from the direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get throughto Pisa, or attack Castruccio’s forces except at a disadvantage. In onecase they would find themselves placed between his two armies, the oneunder his own command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other casethey would have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy,an undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to takethis latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of theriver and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide expanseof land between them and the river.

The Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war todecide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and,having weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon thelatter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet thewater reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the saddles ofthe horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the Florentines commencedthe battle by ordering forward a number of cavalry and ten thousandinfantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was fixed, and who well knewwhat to do, at once attacked the Florentines with five thousand infantryand three thousand horsemen, not allowing them to issue from the riverbefore he charged them; he also sent one thousand light infantry up theriver bank, and the same number down the Arno. The infantry of theFlorentines were so much impeded by their arms and the water that theywere not able to mount the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry had madethe passage of the river more difficult for the others, by reason of thefew who had crossed having broken up the bed of the river, and this beingdeep with mud, many of the horses rolled over with their riders and manyof them had stuck so fast that they could not move. When the Florentinecaptains saw the difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew themand moved higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed lesstreacherous and the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met atthe bank by the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, who,being light armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly withtremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses,alarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and trampledeach other in great confusion. The fight between the men of Castruccio andthose of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp and terrible; bothsides fought with the utmost desperation and neither would yield. Thesoldiers of Castruccio fought to drive the others back into the river,whilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on land in order to makeroom for the others pressing forward, who if they could but get out of thewater would be able to fight, and in this obstinate conflict they wereurged on by their captains. Castruccio shouted to his men that these werethe same enemies whom they had before conquered at Serravalle, whilst theFlorentines reproached each other that the many should be overcome by thefew. At length Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and thatboth his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides hadmany killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to takeup a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commandedthese latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and onepart of them to turn to the right and another to the left. This cleared aspace of which the Florentines at once took advantage, and thus gainedpossession of a portion of the battlefield. But when these tired soldiersfound themselves at close quarters with Castruccio’s reserves they couldnot stand against them and at once fell back into the river. The cavalryof either side had not as yet gained any decisive advantage over theother, because Castruccio, knowing his inferiority in this arm, hadcommanded his leaders only to stand on the defensive against the attacksof their adversaries, as he hoped that when he had overcome the infantryhe would be able to make short work of the cavalry. This fell out as hehad hoped, for when he saw the Florentine army driven back across theriver he ordered the remainder of his infantry to attack the cavalry ofthe enemy. This they did with lance and javelin, and, joined by their owncavalry, fell upon the enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him toflight. The Florentine captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalryhad met with in crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantrycross lower down the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio’sarmy. But here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men ofCastruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines wereso completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of themescaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains weretaken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with MichelagnoloFalconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine commissioners, fled toEmpoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter was infinitely greater, asmight be expected in such a battle. Of the Florentines there fell twentythousand two hundred and thirty-one men, whilst Castruccio lost onethousand five hundred and seventy men.

But Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his lifejust at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus ruined allthose plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry into effect,and in the successful prosecution of which nothing but death could havestopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle the whole of theday; and when the end of it came, although fatigued and overheated, hestood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on their return fromvictory and personally thank them. He was also on the watch for anyattempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day; he being of theopinion that it was the duty of a good general to be the first man in thesaddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio stood exposed to a windwhich often rises at midday on the banks of the Arno, and which is oftenvery unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of which he thought nothing, ashe was accustomed to such troubles; but it was the cause of his death. Onthe following night he was attacked with high fever, which increased sorapidly that the doctors saw it must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore,called Pagolo Guinigi to him, and addressed him as follows:

“If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the midstof the career which was leading to that glory which all my successespromised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left thee, if asmaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, because I shouldhave been content with the governorships of Lucca and Pisa. I shouldneither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the Florentines withso many injuries. But I would have made both these peoples my friends, andI should have lived, if no longer, at least more peacefully, and have leftyou a state without a doubt smaller, but one more secure and establishedon a surer foundation. But Fortune, who insists upon having thearbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me with sufficient judgment torecognize this from the first, nor the time to surmount it. Thou hastheard, for many have told thee, and I have never concealed it, how Ientered the house of thy father whilst yet a boy—a stranger to allthose ambitions which every generous soul should feel—and how I wasbrought up by him, and loved as though I had been born of his blood; howunder his governance I learned to be valiant and capable of availingmyself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been witness. When thy goodfather came to die, he committed thee and all his possessions to my care,and I have brought thee up with that love, and increased thy estate withthat care, which I was bound to show. And in order that thou shouldst notonly possess the estate which thy father left, but also that which myfortune and abilities have gained, I have never married, so that the loveof children should never deflect my mind from that gratitude which I owedto the children of thy father. Thus I leave thee a vast estate, of which Iam well content, but I am deeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it theeunsettled and insecure. Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, whichwill never rest contented under thy government. Thou hast also Pisa,where the men are of nature changeable and unreliable, who, although theymay be sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serveunder a Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten upwith factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of thewrongs recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offendedFlorentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly destroyed,who will hail the news of my death with more delight than they would theacquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the princes of Milanthou canst place no reliance, for they are far distant, slow, and theirhelp is very long in coming. Therefore, thou hast no hope in anything butin thine own abilities, and in the memory of my valour, and in theprestige which this latest victory has brought thee; which, as thouknowest how to use it with prudence, will assist thee to come to termswith the Florentines, who, as they are suffering under this great defeat,should be inclined to listen to thee. And whereas I have sought to makethem my enemies, because I believed that war with them would conduce to mypower and glory, thou hast every inducement to make friends of them,because their alliance will bring thee advantages and security. It is ofthe greatest important in this world that a man should know himself, andthe measure of his own strength and means; and he who knows that he hasnot a genius for fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace.And it will be well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and tolearn in this way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; andin this thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe thatwhat I have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, inthat I have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.”

After this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, andLucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending Pagoloto them, and making them swear obedience to him as his successor, he died.He left a happy memory to those who had known him, and no prince of thosetimes was ever loved with such devotion as he was. His obsequies werecelebrated with every sign of mourning, and he was buried in San Francescoat Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to Pagolo Guinigi as she had been toCastruccio, for he had not the abilities. Not long after the death ofCastruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, and then Pistoia, and only with difficultyheld on to Lucca. This latter city continued in the family of Guinigiuntil the time of the great-grandson of Pagolo.

From what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a manof exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time, butalso by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the ordinaryheight, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious presence, and hewelcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke with him rarely lefthim displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, and he wore it cut shortabove the ears, and, whether it rained or snowed, he always went without ahat. He was delightful among friends, but terrible to his enemies; just tohis subjects; ready to play false with the unfaithful, and willing toovercome by fraud those whom he desired to subdue, because he was wont tosay that it was the victory that brought the glory, not the methods ofachieving it. No one was bolder in facing danger, none more prudent inextricating himself. He was accustomed to say that men ought to attempteverything and fear nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, becauseone always sees that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was alsowonderfully sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he didnot look for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he wasnot angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened thathe has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on thefollowing occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a partridge,and was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom Castruccio hadsaid: “You would not have given more than a penny.” “That is true,”answered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: “A ducat is much less tome.” Having about him a flatterer on whom he had spat to show that hescorned him, the flatterer said to him: “Fisherman are willing to let thewaters of the sea saturate them in order that they may take a few littlefishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by spittle that I may catch awhale”; and this was not only heard by Castruccio with patience butrewarded. When told by a priest that it was wicked for him to live sosumptuously, Castruccio said: “If that be a vice then you should not fareso splendidly at the feasts of our saints.” Passing through a street hesaw a young man as he came out of a house of ill fame blush at being seenby Castruccio, and said to him: “Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thoucomest out, but when thou goest into such places.” A friend gave him avery curiously tied knot to undo and was told: “Fool, do you think that Iwish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to fasten.” Castrucciosaid to one who professed to be a philosopher: “You are like the dogs whoalways run after those who will give them the best to eat,” and wasanswered: “We are rather like the doctors who go to the houses of thosewho have the greatest need of them.” Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn,Castruccio was much disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and wasreproached for cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he didnot fear anything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that,since every man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by onewhat he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: “When thou goest to abanquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon another.”To a person who was boasting that he had read many things, Castrucciosaid: “He knows better than to boast of remembering many things.” Someonebragged that he could drink much without becoming intoxicated. Castruccioreplied: “An ox does the same.” Castruccio was acquainted with a girl withwhom he had intimate relations, and being blamed by a friend who told himthat it was undignified for him to be taken in by a woman, he said: “Shehas not taken me in, I have taken her.” Being also blamed for eating verydainty foods, he answered: “Thou dost not spend as much as I do?” andbeing told that it was true, he continued: “Then thou art more avariciousthan I am gluttonous.” Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich andsplendid citizen of Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown byTaddeo into a chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stonesrepresenting flowers and foliage of the most beautiful colouring.Castruccio gathered some saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo,and seeing him much disturbed by this, said to him: “I knew not where tospit in order to offend thee less.” Being asked how Caesar died he said:“God willing I will die as he did.” Being one night in the house of one ofhis gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one ofhis friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was usualin one of his station, so he said: “He who is considered wise by day willnot be considered a fool at night.” A person came to demand a favour ofCastruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea threw himself onhis knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by Castruccio, said:“Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast thy ears in thyfeet,” whereupon he obtained double the favour he had asked. Castruccioused to say that the way to hell was an easy one, seeing that it was in adownward direction and you travelled blindfolded. Being asked a favour byone who used many superfluous words, he said to him: “When you haveanother request to make, send someone else to make it.” Having beenwearied by a similar man with a long oration who wound up by saying:“Perhaps I have fatigued you by speaking so long,” Castruccio said: “Youhave not, because I have not listened to a word you said.” He used to sayof one who had been a beautiful child and who afterwards became a fineman, that he was dangerous, because he first took the husbands from thewives and now he took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man wholaughed, he said: “Do you laugh because you are successful or becauseanother is unfortunate?” Whilst he was still in the charge of MesserFrancesco Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: “What shall I giveyou if you will let me give you a blow on the nose?” Castruccio answered:“A helmet.” Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had beeninstrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had donewrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceivedthemselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatlythose men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying thatthey were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused whenthe time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise that whilstmen in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first to learn if itwere good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with only looking ather. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to be buried when hedied, and answered: “With the face turned downwards, for I know when I amgone this country will be turned upside down.” On being asked if it hadever occurred to him to become a friar in order to save his soul, heanswered that it had not, because it appeared strange to him that FraLazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione della Faggiuola to theInferno. He was once asked when should a man eat to preserve his health,and replied: “If the man be rich let him eat when he is hungry; if he bepoor, then when he can.” Seeing one of his gentlemen make a member of hisfamily lace him up, he said to him: “I pray God that you will let him feedyou also.” Seeing that someone had written upon his house in Latin thewords: “May God preserve this house from the wicked,” he said, “The ownermust never go in.” Passing through one of the streets he saw a small housewith a very large door, and remarked: “That house will fly through thedoor.” He was having a discussion with the ambassador of the King ofNaples concerning the property of some banished nobles, when a disputearose between them, and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of theking. “Is this king of yours a bad man or a good one?” asked Castruccio,and was told that he was a good one, whereupon he said, “Why should yousuggest that I should be afraid of a good man?”

I could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and weighty,but I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his highqualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a prince. Andas he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune, so he alsodesired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune; therefore themanacles with which he was chained in prison are to be seen to this dayfixed up in the tower of his residence, where they were placed by him totestify forever to his days of adversity. As in his life he was inferiorneither to Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander, nor to Scipio ofRome, so he died in the same year of his age as they did, and he woulddoubtless have excelled both of them had Fortune decreed that he should beborn, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia or Rome.

• New original cover art included with this eBook is granted to the public domain.

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